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ABSTRACT 
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TURKEY 
 
Begüm Baydar 
M.A. Thesis, July 2018 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. E. Fuat Keyman 
Keywords: Cyprus conflict, Turkey, European Union, Exclusive Economic Zone, Natural 
Resources 
 
Cyprus Conflict has been persisting for many decades. Even though, the United Nations has 
made several attempts to solve the conflict, no solution has been reached. With the change of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus president and the change of the Republic of Cyprus 
president, hope started to rise that the vicious cycle of the conflict could be altered. Also, 
recently there has been a new water pipeline project between Turkey and Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. Besides, there has also been recent hydrocarbon discoveries in the Levant 
basin, which is in the Eastern Mediterranean and covers the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Cyprus. In such a nexus, by using the theoretical framework of structure/agency, the aim of the 
thesis is to research and analyze whether and in what ways resources (water and natural gas) 
can change the course of the Cypriot conflict and what is Turkey’s role in this nexus. After the 
change of the presidents, resource allocation for water and natural gas provides an incentive for 
both actors to negotiate and resolve their conflict, but these are not enough to solve the issues 
that come from the past and create a hurdle in the mediation process today.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
KIBRIS UYUŞMAZLIĞINDA İŞ BİRLİĞİNE KARŞI UYUMSUZLUK: TÜRKİYE’NİN  
ROLÜ 
 
BEGÜM BAYDAR 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Kıbrıs uyuşmazlığı, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge, 
Doğal Kaynaklar 
 
Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı yıllardır sürmektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler bu sorunu çözmek için çeşitli 
girişimlerde bulunmuş olmasına ragmen, bir sonuca varamamıştır. Bu bağlamda, Kuzey Kıbrıs 
Türk Cumhuriyetinde ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetinde cumhurbaşkanlarının değişimi, bu kısır 
döngünün değişebileceği yönünde umutları arttırmıştır. Son dönemlerde, KKTC ve Türkiye 
arasında su boru hattı projesi başlamıştır. Bunun dışında Doğu Akdenizin Levant havzasında 
hidrokarbon keşifleri yapılmıştır. Bu bölge Kıbrıs’ın münhasır ekonomik bölgesinin bir 
parçasıdır. Bu konjonktürü göz önünde bulundurarak, bu çalışmanın amacı, yapı/yapan teorik 
çerçeveyi kullanarak doğal kaynakların Kıbrıs sorunundaki rolünü analiz edip, bunların 
çözümdeki rolünü incelemektir. Aynı zamanda Türkiye’nin de rolü bu soruya dahil edilmiştir. 
Aktörlerin değişiminden sonra, su ve doğal gaz kaynaklarının paylaştırımı bu bağlamda iki aktör 
için teşvik sağlamaktadır, fakat bu kaynaklar geçmişten gelen sorunları çözmekte yeterli 
değildir. Aksine, kaynakları ilave bir engel haline gelmiştir. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The Cypriot conflict which has started in the mid-20th century has been persisting for many 
decades. Even though there have been many attempts to solve the conflict, until today no 
solution has been reached. Thus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is standing 
on its own, and it is not recognized by the international community whereas the Greek Cypriot 
administration is seen by the international community as the sole government and representative 
of Cyprus.1 
In the early period of 2015, with the election of Mustafa Akıncı as the president of Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, hopes for a settlement increased. One of the reasons for this was 
the political background of Mustafa Akıncı. Additionally, in 2004, before Mustafa Akıncı and 
Nicos Anastasiades became the president of TRNC and RoC, they were two important 
supporters of the Annan Plan. After, the election of Akıncı, both presidents demonstrated their 
willingness for a settlement of the conflict by walking together through both sides of Nicosia.2 
This occasion foreshadowed a possibility for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Thus after 
2015, negotiation rounds started to accelerate again. 
Throughout many speeches which are indicated in various parts of the thesis, Mustafa Akıncı 
proposed that resources (water and natural gas) could be used as an incentive in the mediation 
of the conflict.  In this respect, the question of whether the recent developments could become 
an incentive for the settlement of the conflict arises. The recent developments are the water 
                                                          
1 Onur Öymen, Silahsız Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi (Etiler-İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2015), 460. 
 
2 Deutsche Welle, “Rival Leaders Take Historic Stroll through Cyprus Capital,” May 23, 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/rival-
leaders-take-historic-stroll-through-cyprus-capital/a-18472011. 
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project between Turkey and TRNC, and the recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  
Since early periods, due to climate change and geographical location of the island of Cyprus, 
water supply has been constituting as a major problem. For many years, the two communities 
of the island have obtained their water supply from desalination plants and from a small number 
of water dams. However, because of climate change, precipitation rates have decreased which 
decreased water supply of the island.3 Thus, the problem of water scarcity arose.  In recent years, 
Turkey built a water pipeline to TRNC in order to solve the problem.4 
Secondly, due to its strategic geographical location, the island stands in the middle of important 
energy routes which increases the significance of the island. In this respect, recent hydrocarbon 
discoveries have increased the geopolitical importance of the island.5 In March 2010, the U.S. 
Geological survey announced that the Levant Basin in the Eastern Mediterranean has an 
essential potential of recoverable natural gas fields. The survey estimated that there is around 
3455 billion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas.6 Thus, this occasion has also increased the 
geopolitical importance of Cyprus because the Levant basin also covers a part of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus. When countries define and agree on the boundaries of their 
EEZ, they can freely exploit the resources within their EEZ boundaries.7 However, there are 
problems of the EEZ which have effects on the Cypriot conflict. These problems and its effects 
on the Cypriot conflict will be elaborately analyzed in the thesis. 
                                                          
3 Michael Mason and Rebecca Bryant, “Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus.” Rep. Water Technology and 
Sustainability in North Cyprus. Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 2017. 
 
4 Rebecca Bryant, “Cyprus 'Peace Water' Project: How It Could Affect Greek-Turkish Relations on the Island.” European 
Politics and Policy LSE European Institute (blog), November 10, 2015. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/28/how-
turkeys-peace-water-project-could-affect-relations-between-greek-and-turkish-cypriots/. 
 
5 Hüseyin Canyaş, Süha Kocakuşak, and F. Orkunt Canyaş, "The Security Architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Relations between Israel and Cyprus in Terms of Global Power Relations," TODAİE’s Review of Public Administration 7, 
no. 2 (June 2013):116. 
 
6 “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean.” March 
2010. Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean. U.S. 
Department of the Interior / U.S. Geological Survey. https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf 
 
7 “Preamble to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Accessed 29 March 2018, United Nations. United 
Nations. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm 
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In this respect, the thesis will examine whether and in what ways the resources (energy and 
water) could become an incentive for mediation. In order to answer this question, the first 
chapter elaborates on the long-lasting Cypriot conflict. The first part gives a brief insight on the 
earlier phases of the Cypriot conflict. The second part focuses on the UN attempts to solve the 
conflict. Here, the Annan Plan and the accession of Cyprus to the EU plays an important role 
since it can be interpreted as a game changer in the Cypriot conflict. The latter part of the chapter 
focuses on the election of Mustafa Akıncı and it gives special emphasis to the recent negotiation 
rounds between Akıncı and Anastasiades.  
The second chapter of the thesis focuses on the problem of water scarcity of Cyprus. The chapter 
clarifies the water problem and it also elaborates on the water pipeline project between TRNC 
and Turkey. The aim of this chapter is to analyze whether this project could serve as an incentive 
in the negotiation process between the two communities.  
The third chapter assesses the recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean. This 
chapter sheds light to earlier conflict in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey in order to 
clarify its effects on the Exclusive Economic Zone problems in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Furthermore, the chapter analyzes possible pipeline projects from Cyprus and Israel to the EU. 
By evaluating possible pipeline projects, the chapter tries to assess if the projected pipeline 
projects could act as an incentive in the negotiation process of the Cypriot conflict. 
 In the last chapter, the thesis firstly examines the rising regional power of Turkey. Afterwards, 
the thesis elaborates on the effects of Turkey as a regional power on the Cypriot conflict. This 
chapter gives special emphasis on three issues that act as a hurdle in the negotiation process of 
the Cypriot conflict. These three issues are the Karpas Peninsula, Turkish military presence in 
Cyprus, and the issue of rotating presidency. By considering these three factors, the role of 
Turkey and the security concerns of the actors are analyzed. 
In this respect, after having examined the two important factors (water and natural gas) that 
could become an incentive, the thesis argues that after the change of the presidents of both sides, 
resource allocation for water and natural gas provides an incentive for both actors to negotiate 
and resolve their conflict, but these are not enough to solve the issue that comes from the past. 
In other words, the resources add up to the already existing problems. These existing problems 
come from the past and they are factors that shape the actions of presidents of both sides today 
4 
 
(TRNC and RoC). Thus, even though both presidents want to settle the conflict, they cannot act 
as they wish because of the political concerns that come from the past and limit their actions 
today. The thesis supports this argument with the theoretical framework of the relationship 
between structure and agency. 
 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In order to frame and analyze the Cypriot conflict, this part tries to provide a theoretical 
framework.  
In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx states that,  
“(m)en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past.”8 
In the book Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony Through 
Transformation (2014) Keyman and Gümüşçü apply this to the structure/agency debate. Here, 
it is proposed that agents (political actors) make their own history. However, agents cannot do 
this as they desire, since the structure determines their actions. In other words, agents operate 
under the structure, and the decisions of the agents are determined by the circumstances in the 
structure. These circumstances are transmitted from the past, or they are already in existence. 
Therefore, the capabilities of the agents are limited by the given circumstances. 9 
This explanation of the structure/agency debate can be applied to the Cypriot case. The change 
in the presidents/agents increased hope for a settlement of the conflict because both leaders were 
visualized as more optimistic and welcoming towards a solution. Two examples for this was 
that in 2015, the Turkish Cypriot leader and the Greek Cypriot leader walked together through 
                                                          
8 Karl Marx, 1852. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: Die Revolution in Keyman, E. Fuat, and 
Şebnem Gümüşçü. 2014: 71-72.  Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony Through Transformation. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
9 Keyman and Gümüşçü, 72.  
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different sides of Nicosia. The other example was that in 2004, before Akıncı and Anastasiades 
were the presidents, both were supporters of the Annan Plan. Thus, the change in agents implied 
that the new actors are more willing towards a common solution to the conflict. By taking into 
the suggestion of Marx, here it should be interpreted that even though both leaders were in favor 
of a settlement, they could not achieve this aim at the given period because of given the 
circumstances. These circumstances are the occasions that come from the previous stages of the 
conflict that shape the structure today. The actors act in line with this structure which limits their 
actions and capabilities for a solution. Thus, even though resources could be an incentive, the 
circumstances that come from the past limit the actions of the actors. As a result, because of the 
political concerns that come from the past, resources have added up to these factors and they 
have become additional obstacles for a settlement of the conflict. More elaborately, both parties 
have overlapping interests that come from the past which effect the process of the negotiations 
today. The parties and actors are trying to increase their political gains because of the given 
structure. Hence, in such an environment, actors which have limited choices, could not use the 
resources as an incentive.  
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Early Period 
 
 
Cyprus conflict has been persisting for many decades. There have been several attempts to solve 
the conflict. One of these was the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, which assisted the 
formation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. However, due to rising tensions and conflict, the 
constitution failed to create lasting peace. After 1974, with the intervention of Turkey, relations 
between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots entered into a stalemate. Since 1977, 
negotiations have continued between the two parties. Negotiations were initiated both by the 
two parties themselves and by the UN, but no agreement has been reached10. This chapter aims 
to elaborate on the history of the negotiation process and the UN initiatives. 
Throughout history, Cyprus has been ruled by different empires, such as the Assyrians, 
Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Arabs and Crusaders. The Ottoman Empire started to rule Cyprus 
in 1571, and it remained a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. In 1878 the island was ceded 
to Britain.11 After this ascent, the Greek Cypriots launched a struggle for independence against 
British rule. During this struggle, the Greek Cypriots maintained the ideal of uniting with their 
“motherland” Greece. The Turkish Cypriots saw this as a threat and as a response demanded 
Taksim (partition of Cyprus).  This created tension between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
                                                          
10  "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed March 2, 2018. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa 
 
11   "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.  
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Cypriots. Thus, in 1959 the agreements of Guarantee and Alliance were signed, which led to the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The new republic was based on a bi-communal 
partnership. However, the Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied with the bi-communal system, 
which lead to rising tensions between both parties again. Finally, in 1974 a military junta was 
established in Greece to annex Cyprus to Greece. In order to stop Greece from annexing Cyprus, 
Turkey launched a military intervention into Cyprus. Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided into 
two parts, the Greek Cypriot territory and the Turkish Cypriot territory.12  
Makarios who was the president of Southern Cyprus and Denktash who was the president of the 
Northern part of Cyprus, started negotiations on the 12th of February 1977. Unfortunately, 
Makarios died on the 31st of August and Kipriyanu came to power, interrupting the negotiations 
because Kipriyanu was reluctant to complete them. However, the negotiations appeared on the 
political agenda again two years later in 1979. Kipriyanu and Denktaş agreed on ten clauses for 
negotiations, but the result was a stalemate.  After this occasion, the Turkish officials perceived 
that the Greek Cypriots were unwilling to make an agreement, so the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was declared on the 15th of November 1983. This declaration was not 
welcomed in the international political arena. Even today, only Turkey recognizes the TRNC.13   
In 1985, a new round of negotiations began under the supervision of the United Nations. Both 
the Greek Cypriot Community and the Turkish Cypriot Community were invited to the United 
Nations meetings in New York. The Secretary General of the UN, Perez de Cuellar, closely 
followed these meetings, proposing a new plan based on the desires of both sides.14 According 
to this plan “the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be composed of two federal states and its 
constitutional structure would be based on two zones and two communities”15. However, again 
no agreement on this issue could be reached. The most important development in this period 
that affected the course of the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was Greece 
entering the European Community (now the EU) in 1981. By accepting Greece, the Community 
                                                          
12 Senem Aydın Düzgit and Nathalie Tocci, Turkey and the European Union. (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015) 11-13. 
 
13 Onur Öymen, Silahsız Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi (Etiler-İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2015), 460. 
 
14 Öymen, 461. 
 
15 İnanç Kamburoğlu, “Behind the change in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus between 2002 and 2004: The impact of 
leadership and the EU” (PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham 2015), 64. 
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has lost its capability to employ any pressure on the country16.  Backed by the European 
Community, Greece started to use its position and they started to put pressure on Turkey and 
Turkish Cypriots to resolve the issue17. Until Greece was accepted to the Community, Greece 
and Turkey were treated equally in the eyes of the West (Europeans and the United States). This 
could be observed from the positive attitudes of the EC when both Turkey and Greece applied 
because the EC welcomed the applications of both countries18. In 1980, there was a coup in 
Turkey, and this occasion froze the relations between the EU and Turkey.19 In other words, it 
could be analyzed that with the membership of Greece to the EC, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots 
were integrated one step further with the EC, whereas the Turks and Turkish Cypriots were one 
step behind. Since the Greeks and Greek Cypriots felt the European support on their back (or 
they could put pressure on the EC), it could be perceived that they started to be more reluctant 
about finding a common solution that satisfied both sides. 
In 1988, Vasiliu became the president of the Greek Cypriots. In order to revive the relationship 
with the Greek Cypriots, Denktash proposed a new plan to Vasiliu. Denktash proposed to 
collaborate in the areas of tourism, trade, environment, sport, and culture. The idea behind this 
collaboration was to establish confidence between the two states. However, this collaboration 
plan was rejected by Vasiliu.20 It could be assumed that, if this plan had been accepted, the trust 
could have been built between the two sides. Trust is important to maintain peace and carry out 
negotiations. Without trust, it is harder to make negotiations. Hence, the proposal of Denktash 
could have encouraged further negotiations. However, the proposal was rejected by the Greek 
Cypriots. The main reason for this rejection could be considered as the approval of Greek side 
could also mean that they have recognized the TRNC. 
In the same year, a forum in which both communities could get to know each other and build 
common interests had been organized. This was referred to as ‘intercommunal talks’. However, 
                                                          
16 Bahar Rumelili, The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict, working paper, Department of Political 
Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham (2004): 9. 
 
17 Rumelili, 8. 
 
18 Atilla Eralp, “The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship,” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 
(2009): 152. 
 
19 Eralp, 154. 
 
20 Öymen, 462. 
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the talks ended in 1990 because the Greek Cypriots stated that they did not “accept the principle 
of equality between the two communities.”21 From both of the examples above, it could be 
inferred that the Greek Cypriots were reluctant to find a common solution that satisfied both 
sides. 
In March 1990, the Security Council of the UN reaffirmed in its resolution 649, that they support 
the establishment of a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus. The resolution pointed out the 
importance of the independent Republic of Cyprus which would “exclude union in whole or in 
part with any other country and any form of partition or secession.”22  
In 1992, the United Nations Security Council put out a “Set of Ideas”. This was an informal 
draft of a negotiation framework on which negotiations could be constructed upon.23 Also, in 
1994, the Vienna negotiations took place between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
These discussions were held under UN auspices. During this period, the Turkish Cypriots had 
accepted the Confidence Building measures that would create trust between the parties. 
However, the Greek Cypriots did not accept these measures, and so this negotiation process was 
closed without any positive outcome. Another step in solving the issue was taken again in 1995 
by Denktash. He proposed a “4-point Peace Offensive”, which urged for a bi-communal and bi-
zonal federal republic of Cyprus. Additionally, in 1997, it was asserted that sovereignty of the 
Republic of Cyprus would stem from the equality of the two communities which was stated in 
the Joint Draft Statement. 24 Again, the Greek Cypriots had rejected this statement.  
In 1993, the Greek Cypriot side applied for EU membership. The application emanated from 
strategic and political concerns rather than economic reasons. The Greek Cypriot leader Clerides 
stressed out in a speech that, this application would be a stronger guarantee for them which 
would clear away Turkey’s right of intervention which was given by the Treaty of Guarantee. 
Thus, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots aspired that the EU would settle the Cyprus issue in respect 
                                                          
21Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The Cyprus Debacle: What the Future Holds,” Futures 31 no.6 (1999): 562.  
 
22 “UNSCR Search Engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” n.d. Security Council Resolution 649 - 
UNSCR. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/649. 
 
23 Müftüler-Baç, 563. 
 
24 Ibid. 
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with their own requests. 25 Additionally, the EU membership was a unique opportunity for the 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots to put international pressure on the Turks and Turkish Cypriots.26 
Hence, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots heavily relied on the membership of the Greek Cypriots 
to the EU.  
Also, in 1993, Greece and the Greek Cypriots signed a pact of mutual defense. This pact aimed 
to strengthen the military cooperation of Greece and Greek Cypriots.27  With this doctrine, 
Greece increased its role as a military power in the Central Mediterranean region.28  
In 1998, full membership negotiations started between Greek Cypriots and the EU. At this point, 
Turkey declared that the further integration of EU and Cyprus would direct Turkey to more 
intensely integrate with TRNC, based on the common declaration stated by Turkey and TRNC 
on the 20th of January 1997.29 After the Luxembourg summit in 1997, the relations deteriorated 
between Turkey and the EU because the EU declared that Turkey was not included in the 
enlargement agenda of the EU.30 In 1998, Denktash stated that there should not be the Federal 
Republic of Cyprus anymore and instead, he stated that discussions could be resumed with the 
new proposal of a confederation. Thus, this proposal put forward that the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot sides would be two sovereign states which are equal states.31 On the one hand, Greek 
Cypriots desire to join the EU and on the other hand the proposal of Denktash for a confederation 
fueled the tension instead of a step to the solution.32 
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1.2. Annan Plan 
 
 
On the 4th of November 1999, in order to slow down the acceleration of the tension and move 
towards a solution, the secretary general of United Nations, Kofi Annan, made an announcement 
stating that negotiations should resume between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, 
negotiations started on the 3rd of December 1999. The specialty of this negotiation process was 
that the two sides did not come face to face with each other. Instead, they held separate 
discussions with the UN, where they had the opportunity to express their concerns and 
inclinations for a solution of the dispute. Based on these discussions, on the 11th of November 
2002, Kofi Annan presented the Annan Plan. At first, both the Greek side and the Turkish side 
refused to sign the plan. Thus, based on the demands of both sides, small arrangements were 
made in the plan. However, again no solution could be reached, so the Annan plan negotiations 
continued.33   
During the same period, the Greek Cypriot membership negotiation resumed between the Greek 
Cypriots and the EU. At the same time, these negotiations were carried out at the Copenhagen 
summit, the EU put forward that the membership of the island of Cyprus was negotiated as a 
whole and not for the Greek Cypriot part alone.34 Here, it is again possible to interpret that the 
EU has been on the side of the Greek Cypriots. Also, this stance of the EU may be regarded as 
the disapproval of the Turkish and UN requests for a federal state. Thus, they see the Turkish 
side as a minority of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot part).  
A factor that determined this stance of the EU was the Greece factor since Greece was a member 
of the EU. Additionally, at first, the EU was reluctant to intensify membership negotiations with 
Cyprus without a solution of the problem. However, at that time the EU gave importance to 
Eastern enlargement, and Greece claimed that if the EU would not implement membership 
negotiations with Cyprus, then they would hinder the negotiations with Eastern Europe. Thus, 
the membership process of Cyprus persisted.35 As a result, it made harder for a negotiation 
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between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to succeed because while the UN and TRNC 
were working on a solution which put forward a federal state, the EU was slowing this process 
down by conducting membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. Naturally, it could be 
maintained that Greek Cypriots did not feel enough energy to struggle for a solution which 
gratifies both sides. 
In 2003, there was a change in the government of Republic of Cyprus. Tasos Papadopoulos won 
the elections as a common candidate of the parties AKEL and DİKO. In February 2003, the 
Annan Plan was updated based on the claims of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On 
the 10th of March, Denktash and Papadopoulos came together in a conference in the Hague with 
the three guarantor countries Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom. Negotiations were held to 
formulate the final version of the Annan Plan. The negotiations lasted for a long time in different 
places and finally ended on the 31h of March 2004. On this date, Kofi Annan represented the 
final draft of the Annan Plan.36  The Annan Plan stated that both sides would recognize the 
different identity and integrity of each other. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus would be based on 
a federal state and a bi-zonal friendship which would be composed of two constituent states: 
“the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State.”37 Both states 
would operate their power inside the given territory. In other words, no side should try to become 
dominant over the other. Thus, respect for each other’s authority and over their territory was 
emphasized. Furthermore, the plan also stated that both sides should respect each other’s 
cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identities.38  
On the 24th of April 2004, a referendum was held in both the Turkish side and Greek side of 
Cyprus. While 75.83% of the Greek population rejected the Plan, 64.92% of the Turkish side 
approved the plan.39 The reason for a negative outcome in the Greek side is the negative stance 
of Papadopoulos. On the 7th of April 2004, Papadopoulos made a speech to his folk by saying 
that they should reject the plan.40 After this occasion, the international arena declared that they 
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were upset about the result of the referendum, but they also pointed out that in these 
circumstances the Turkish side cannot isolate itself anymore.41 As a result, it could be inferred 
that even though the Turkish side displayed a positive attitude for negotiations, they were the 
ones who became affected by the negative results.  
With the full membership of the Greek Cypriots to the EU on the 1st of May 2004, the pressure 
on the Turkish Cypriots increased.42 On the one hand, the membership caused a problem of the 
Turkish membership of EU, on the other hand, it caused a problem to solve the dispute of 
Cyprus. More elaborately, “a country that had said ‘no’ to the Annan Plan in a referendum was 
a member of the EU and would have veto power over Turkey’s accession process.”43  
On the same day, Turkey declared that TRNC is not a part of the European Union and the Greek 
Cypriots do not have a right to represent the whole island in the Union.44 The membership of 
Cyprus could also be inferred as a pressure on TRNC to unite with Cyprus and be recognized 
as a minority. If TRNC had accepted this, they would have to give up on their ideal of a Federal 
Republic.  
Some could maintain that it was a paradox that Papadopoulos accepted the final version of the 
Annan Plan in the UN negotiations but made a speech to his public that they should reject the 
plan. This not only wasted the parties time and efforts, but it abandoned the whole negotiation 
process.  
 
1.3. New Negotiation Rounds 
 
 
On the 3rd of September 2008, a new process of negotiations was initiated. “The six chapters 
discussed in the full-fledged negotiations were ‘Governance and Power Sharing’, ‘Property’, 
‘EU Matters’, ‘Economic Matters’, ‘Territory’ and ‘Security and Guarantees’.”45 During this 
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process Derviş Eroğlu became the new President of TRNC. However, no development was 
attained in the recent round of the negotiations. In 2013, Anastasiades came to power in the 
Greek Cypriot part. Thus, on the 11th of February 2014, Mr. Eroğlu and Mr. Anastasiades 
resumed the negotiation process under the auspices of the UN. At the time the negotiations were 
progressing, the Greek Cypriot side started to initiate off-shore drilling activities.46 This 
stagnated the negotiation process because the Turkish Cypriots claimed that they were doing 
this in the Turkish Cypriots exclusive economic zone. However, the Greek side claimed that it 
was their own licensed area. Thus, in October 2014, the Greek Cypriots cancelled the UN 
negotiation process.47 
  
1.3.1. The Election of Mustafa Akıncı 
 
 
In 2015, Mustafa Akıncı was elected as the new President of the TRNC. The election campaign 
of Mustafa Akıncı was, “With my election there is hope.”48 One of the reasons for this was 
because Akıncı and the Greek Cypriot leader have sown the seeds of constructive dialogue.49 
The optimism for the new presidential election was also stated by Turkey, Greece and Great 
Britain. This optimism was stressed out by the British Foreign secretary as, “The stars are 
aligned.”50  
What made Akıncı trustable for reunification also stemmed from the previous roles he took in 
the politics of the TRNC. Before he became the president, Mustafa Akıncı was the first mayor 
of Northern Nicosia. During this period, he collaborated with the mayor of South Nicosia (Greek 
Cypriot) and they won several awards for their projects.51 After his office as a mayor, Akıncı 
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became the leader of the political party Communal Liberation Party (TKP) and he served here 
from 1987 to 2001. From the years 1991 to 2001, Akıncı also worked as the deputy prime 
minister and minister of tourism. In 2003, he established the ‘peace and democracy movement’ 
which aimed to support reunification efforts based on the Annan Plan.52 During this period, 
Anastasiades who was the leader of the right-wing Greek Cypriot party DISY of that time, also 
supported the Annan Plan.53 This is one of the important incidents that demonstrated that Akıncı 
and Anastasiades are both willing to come to a common solution for the conflict.  
Furthermore, what differentiated Akıncı from the former TRNC presidents was that he was 
perceived as more flexible compared to the former presidents.  More elaborately, former 
presidents urged for a clear separation of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot 
community.54 Akıncı also saw EU integration as an important subject.55 This could also be seen 
from his words, “the efforts by Turkish Cypriots to increase their contacts with the EU as well 
as the preparation for harmonization with the EU laws should continue without interruption.”56 
However, Akıncı also points out that “These efforts should not become victim to the “obstacles” 
imposed by the Greek Cypriot side.”57After the election of Mustafa Akıncı on the 26th of April 
2015, the Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades also expressed his satisfaction by his words, 
“At last, our hopes are high that this country can be reunified.”58 
Finally, when on the 23rd of May 2015, the two leaders walked together down Ledra Street 
which was the dividing line of the island hopes had increased for reconciliation.59 This street 
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was a part of the Turkish Cypriot territory, and it was the first time a Greek Cypriot leader 
stepped onto that territory. Thus, this movement was regarded as a symbol of hope and 
solidarity.60  By taking into account this background and the recent occasion of both leaders 
walking through both sides of Nicosia, hopes increased that finally a settlement to the long-
lasting conflict could come. 
 
1.3.2. Continuation of the Negotiations 
 
 
With the change in agents, comprehensive settlement negotiations proceeded on the 15th of May 
2015. During the negotiation process, there were improvements in the chapters of ‘EU matters’ 
and ‘Economy’ whereas problems occurred in the chapter ‘Governance and Power sharing’.61 
Also, further problems occurred in the chapter of territory. Even though these problems could 
not be solved, this could be considered a positive step because this was the first time such issues 
were discussed since the 2004 Annan Plan. In order enhance and accelerate the negotiations, the 
UN stepped in again, and the Geneva negotiation process started.62   
The plan of the Geneva Conference contained three rounds. The schedule of the meetings was 
that on the 9th of January 2017, all issues excluding territory and security would be discussed. 
On the 11th of January, the territorial dispute would be discussed with both sides representing 
their proposed maps for the adjustment of the disputed territory. Finally, on the 12th of January 
a five-party conference would be held. In this meeting, the guarantor states and the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot side would try to settle the issue of territory and the future of security guarantees 
together. It was thought that this would lead to the final agreement.63 However, there was a 
stalemate again because of the issue of territory. Additionally, Turkey also proposed that the 
four freedoms of EU should also be granted to Turkish Cypriot citizens. This also caused a 
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problem. Thus, the representatives of the five countries had to leave the meeting without any 
result.64   
Anastasiades and Akıncı were keen on resolving the dispute. Therefore, they decided “to 
establish a working group of technical experts to continue to iron out differences and prepare 
for new meetings later in January or February 2017”.65 However, they again they could not 
achieve an agreement. An underlying reason for the failures in the recent rounds of negotiations 
could be pointed out as the pressure of the political parties of both sides. In both parts, the 
opposition parties stated that the leaders (Akıncı and Anastasiades) were being influenced. Thus, 
it could be stated that the pressure from the inside was also a factor which determined stalemate 
in these meeting.66  
Even though it was predicted that negotiations would continue under the positive attitudes of 
the two leaders, this was shattered by the decision of the Greek Cypriot parliament. On the 13th 
of February 2017 the “right-wing ELAM political party introduced an annual event in the form 
of a reading and discussion in public schools to mark the January 1950 referendum on enosis 
(the union of Cyprus with Greece).”67 In this regard, Akıncı stated that he could not continue 
negotiations until this decision was changed. Thus, after long discussions, “the Greek Cypriot 
parliament took action to partially reverse the enosis requirement by turning the decisions over 
how the historical event would be addressed by the Greek Cypriot school system to the 
Education Ministry.”68 After this partial reversal Akıncı decided to continue with the meetings.69  
On the 4th of June, it was decided that there should be a revival of the Geneva conference. This 
was called the Crans Montana conference. Again, the major issue in this conference was the 
security issue. During the conference, representatives of Turkey stated that they could not accept 
to abolish the security guarantees under the existing treaties. However, they stated that they 
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could remove the military troops with the condition that a very small percentage of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot troops would stay, suggesting that the deployment of the troops could be 
renewed in 15 years. However, the Greek Cypriots insisted that the Treaty of Guarantee should 
be abolished. Furthermore, they stated that a small number of troops could stay in the condition 
that a date for their deployment should be immediately set up.70 Together with this issue, there 
was also the unresolved question of rotating presidency. Since no agreement could be reached, 
the conference ended on the 28 of September 2017.71  
All in all, it can be seen that even though, there have been various attempts both by the primary, 
secondary and third parties to solve the dispute. Still, no agreement has been reached. 
Throughout this chapter, it was shown that there had been many underlying reasons for the 
negative outcome of the numerous meetings. First of all, it can be stated that the Greek Cypriot 
community and the Turkish Cypriot community have clashes of interest. In this respect, the 
Greek Cypriot Community does not agree with the UN decisions that a federal republic of 
Cyprus should be formed, based on a bi-communal and bi-zonal state. The Greek Cypriots do 
not recognize the Turkish Cypriot as a different community. Since the 1960 constitution, they 
have been rejecting the equality of the Turkish Cypriots in terms of having equal rights in 
governing the Republic of Cyprus. Until today, they have still not changed their stance and 
instead, they developed other ways to put pressure on the Turkish side to make them join the 
Republic of Cyprus as a minority population. Because of the trust breaking and violent actions 
of the Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots that had happened throughout the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s, it could be argued that the Turkish Cypriots are reluctant to accept the 
proposal of the Greek Cypriots. Also, the population of the Turkish Cypriots is large and thus 
they do not want to be seen as a minority. These circumstances have shaped the TRNC demand 
of establishing a federal state of Cyprus with bi-zonal and bi-communal equality.  
Additionally, there is also the fact that, the demand for the Federal Republic of Cyprus was also 
supported by the numerous UN resolutions.72  
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As stated in the previous parts of this chapter, another critical factor that has helped the Greek 
Cypriots in insisting on their demand could be determined as the Greece factor in the EC/EU. 
Greece has not only influenced the EC to take actions supporting the Greek Cypriot demands 
but also thanks to the Greek pressure inside the EU, Cyprus (as a divided island) was accepted 
as a member of the EU. This not only hindered the Annan Plan, but it also put an obstacle to 
Turkey’s membership process in the EU. 
By elaborating on the historical negotiations and the stances of the different parties, the chapter 
has analyzed that, in order to come to a solution for the long-lasting dispute there needs to be an 
incentive that would encourage the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to come to common 
grounds. This is because the negotiations have turned into a vicious cycle in which the similar 
issues (issues of territory, equality, rotating presidency, and so on) have repeatedly been 
discussed without advancement in the solution. Thus, in thesis it will analyzed if whether and 
in what ways the recent developments in natural resources could become an incentive for the 
Cyprus conflict.  
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CHAPTER 2: WATER SCARCITY IN CYPRUS: SOLUTIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WATER PIPELINE FROM TURKEY ON THE CYPRUS 
CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
The Eastern Mediterranean region is getting warmer and becoming more arid day by day. 
Cyprus is also affected by the rising temperature and climate change in this region. Cyprus has 
been heavily dependent on rainfall for meeting their water demand.73 However, since the 1970’s, 
with increasing climate change, rainfall in Cyprus has fallen by 20%. Thus, this decreased the 
water resources on the island. Both communities in Cyprus have been negatively affected by 
this situation.74 Throughout history, many measures have been taken. However, none of these 
measures were enough to avoid the water crisis in 2008. After this date, the water problem in 
Cyprus became more serious. Therefore, in 2015, Turkey constructed a pipeline from Turkey to 
TRNC in order to solve the water problem in TRNC.  In 2015, politicians and academics of 
Turkey and TRNC believed that this could become a stepping stone into solving the conflict in 
Cyprus because Turkey stated that the Turkish Cypriots could share the water with the Greek 
Cypriots. Hence, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots believed that if Greek Cypriots would accept the 
water, then this pipeline project could be a ‘peace project’. However, the Greek Cypriots 
rejected the water supply that comes from Turkey even though they have lack of water supply.  
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In this chapter, the reasons for the Greek Cypriot stance is elaborated as well as the place of the 
water pipeline in the Cyprus conflict. Afterwards, in the chapter, it is stated that even a vital 
problem such as the water problem has not brought the two communities together due to political 
concerns of the parties. This also stems from the circumstances that comes from the past and 
affects the stance and limits the actions of the agents. 
 
2.1. Water Supply in Cyprus 
 
 
Since its colonial times, the island of Cyprus has been an arid island with a plain nature. “Due 
to the arid climate, evapotranspiration consumes as much as 80% of the total annual 
precipitation”.75 Thus, even in the earlier periods the water problem in the island was visible. In 
this respect, in the 1950’s the British officials wanted to find alternative ways to bring water to 
the island and so they collaborated with an American firm, Ralph Parsons to conduct a research. 
The researchers pointed out that water should be transported from Turkey because this choice 
was the cheapest choice compared with other solutions such as building desalination plants. 
Therefore, after several talks with Turkey, the British officials persuaded Turkish officials to 
initiate this project. According to this project, water would be brought by tanks or by underwater 
pipelines from Turkey to the island of Cyprus. The project would be funded by the U.S. 
However, this project fell into abeyance after a Turkish ship was caught in the Mediterranean 
which was bringing weapons to the island.76 Thus, search for continuous water supplies began.  
In the 1960s one of the very first plans for this issue was the plan of Makarios III called “No 
drop to the Sea’.77 In this respect, dams were constructed, and the freshwater storage capacities 
were increased which were based on rainfall and river flow in a significant amount.78 
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When the island was divided into two in 1974, the Northern region of Cyprus was rich in high 
yielding citrus farms, but this region was deprived from a larger quantity of water supply since 
the groundwater sources coming from the Troodos mountains was in the Southern part of the 
line.79 Thus, the only functioning underwater aquifer in the Northern part was an aquifer in 
Morphou.80 
In the 1990s, the problem of water scarcity intensified due to climate change. Precipitation rates 
had decreased by a significant amount. Thus, the dams which were based on rainfall could not 
provide sufficient water to meet the demand.  The Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC started to 
take different measures in this respect. In the Republic of Cyprus, Clerides initiated the 
construction and development of desalination plants. With this plan the aim of the government 
was to meet the domestic and industrial water demand from desalination plants and they also 
aimed to use surface water for irrigation purposes. Thus, desalination plants and underground 
aquifers provided water supply.81 However, these measures could not prevent the coming water 
crisis in 2008 because of four other issues.  
Firstly, some of the remaining water reservoirs in some areas got mixed with mud, and the 
percentage of salt in some underground aquifers increased in a substantial amount. Also, more 
than half of the capacity of the desalination plants could not be used because of the problems 
caused by the high levels of salt that is inside the water. Thus, the quality of water decreased 
which had an essential impact on water supply.82 Secondly, due to climate change, precipitation 
rates decreased even more which had a serious effect on the water supply of the aquifers. More 
elaborately, “Repeated and persistent drought episodes reduced direct and indirect groundwater 
recharge, while the construction of dams further reduced recharge of downstream aquifers”.83 
Thirdly, because of the economic crisis and the austerity measures, president Papadopoulos put 
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halt on the investments for desalination plants.84 Lastly, the RoC also did not have sufficient 
water management capabilities.85   
Compared to the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC stayed behind in the developments of 
increasing water supply. The few developments in TRNC could also not prevent the 
forthcoming 2008 water crisis because of the mismanagement of water supply. In order to 
elaborate the problems in managing the water supply, three issues will be put forward. 
The first issue is that at first, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) of Turkey instituted some projects 
such as drip irrigation to increase the efficiency in using the water supply. However, due to the 
unconditional agricultural assistance from Turkey, such small-scale projects for water 
management did not seem attractive.86  
Secondly, in TRNC, the management and allocation of water were decentralized. The 
municipalities were in charge of water management. “Municipalities use water bills to collect 
payments for other local services (e.g., waste disposal), making them a major revenue-raising 
instrument for local government.”87 This caused the politicization of water management, so the 
water supply was not distributed by regarding future needs. Also, the governments in TRNC 
changed constantly which complicated the process of planning and regulating the system of 
water supply for municipalities.88  
The third problem was the inefficient usage of water supply. Besides local people, farmers have 
also used the water supply in an inefficient way.89 Thus, it can be seen that even though TRNC 
has a meager water supply, they have not made a long-term plan to manage the water supply. 
Even though municipalities were in charge of the management, they did not give enough 
supervision and thus there was a waste of water which not only decreased the water supply, but 
it also decreased the quality of the water in TRNC. 
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Thus, it can be seen that both regions suffered from water problems because of climate change 
and lack of water management. Here it should also be pointed out that the water resources of 
the island are also affected by seawater intrusion and also rising water demand in the seasons in 
which tourism is high.90 However, it was seen that even though RoC had taken some measures, 
the problems concerning water supply reached a peak in 2008 and both regions in the island of 
Cyprus experienced water crisis.  
 
2.2. 2008 Water Crisis of Cyprus 
 
 
In March 2008, water crisis reached a peak in the whole island. There was a drought in the 
largest water reservoirs of Cyprus, Kouris (Greek Cypriot Part). “Authorities (of the Greek-
Cypriot Administration) said they would cut water supplies to district distribution networks by 
30 percent. They would also seek water imports from Greece, likely to occur in the next five 
months, Stefanou said”.91 Therefore, the next month an agreement was signed between the 
Greek Cypriots and Greece which projected the transportation of clean water from Greece to 
Cyprus through ships. However, the cost of the transportation and infrastructure was very high. 
Only the transportation cost was 35 million €. The total cost was 5.125€ per million cubic meters 
(mcm) of water imported. This was a very expensive option because it was approximately five 
times more expensive then water obtained from desalination plants.92 Therefore, another 
solution was needed in order to cope with water scarcity in the island. Therefore, “Since 2008, 
four desalination plants have been built which can produce a total 220,000 cubic meters 
of water daily, covering the supply needs of Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta.”93 
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In the TRNC, the minister of agriculture Önder Sennaroğlu stated that this drought was one of 
biggest droughts Cyprus has faced and he stated that the government is working on measures to 
overcome this issue. In this respect, he stated that the government in TRNC will give drought 
compensation advanced payment to the farmers, since the drought has seriously affected 
agriculture. Also, he stressed out that TRNC would import 60 thousand tons of barley and 30 
thousand tons of corn from Turkey.94 Furthermore, in the year 2008, Turkey has spent around 
2.551.893€ to TRNC for the construction and development of new dams, main transmission 
lines and other projects concerning water supply and investment. In the same year, Turkey also 
finished the project of the construction of a wastewater treatment plant in Kyrenia. 95 
As stated before, the reason for this drought was because since the 1970s rainfall in Cyprus has 
fallen by 20 percent.96 The 2008 crisis was turning point in the water problem of Cyprus because 
this issue has shown the seriousness of the increasing water shortages of Cyprus. After this 
occasion, more desalination plants were built. However, desalination plants also have their 
consequences. For example, they are more expensive compared to dam water and carbon 
dioxide is emitted during the desalination process.97 After these occasions, Turkey proposed to 
introduce a peace water project with TRNC, which aimed to transport 75 mcm of water per 
year.98 
 
2.3. Turkey-TRNC Water Pipeline 
 
 
In 2011, Turkey decided to initiate a water project with TRNC because of the decreasing 
precipitation rates and future risks of droughts. According to this project a pipeline would be 
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built between from Mersin, Turkey to Kyrenia, TRNC. The pipeline would connect the 
Alaköprü dam in Turkey and the Geçitköy Dam in TRNC. The goal of this project was to supply 
water to Turkish Cypriots for 50 years.99 75 million cubic meters (mcm) of water would be 
transported yearly. It was planned that 37,76 mcm would be used as clean water for drinking, 
industries and other usages whereas 37,24 mcm would be used for irrigation water.100 However, 
when the project was opened in 2015, new problems emerged about how to manage the water 
supply because it was argued that the municipalities should not be the only ones in charge of 
the water system. Because of this problem, the pipeline could not operate until 2016. After 
several negotiations, it was decided that the management of the water supply would be given to 
a supreme board which would include TRNC government agency and a Turkish Cypriot private 
firm.101 With this negotiation, it can be seen that the water management in TRNC would not be 
given into the hands of municipalities which could not cope with the management of water. 
Instead, a public-private Turkish Cypriot partnership was created which would use the water 
supply in the intended way and thus reach the goals of development.  
When the pipeline was being constructed, politicians and academicians from TRNC, and 
Turkish politicians believed that this project would give many advantages to TRNC. First of all, 
the former prime minister of Turkey, Davutoğlu, stated that “We are bringing water, we believe 
that both communities in Cyprus will live peacefully.”102 Mustafa Akıncı stated that due to 
globalization that the world is facing today, water has become more important than petroleum. 
He also stated that the water would change the color of Cyprus from yellow to green and TRNC 
will increase its production.103 Finally, the prime minister of TRNC Ömer Kalyoncu also stated 
that one day this water supply could pave the way for peace.104  Furthermore, Mehmet Hasgüler, 
                                                          
99 Hurriyet Daily, “Turkish Cyprus Receives Millions of Tons of Fresh Water from Turkey,” August 16, 2016. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-cyprus-receives-millions-of-tons-of-fresh-water-from-turkey---102910. 
 
100 Sozcu, “‘KKTC Su Temin Projesi’ Hizmete Alındı,” November 17, 2015. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/ekonomi/kktc-
su-temin-projesi-aciliyor-962092/ 
 
101 Zeynep Gürcanlı, “KKTC Ile ‘Su Meselesi’ Çözülüyor,” Sozcu, February 9, 2016. 
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/kktc-ile-su-meselesi-cozuluyor-1082131/ 
 
102 Hurriyet, “KKTC Su Temin Projesi'nin Açılışı Gerçekleştirildi,” October 17, 2015. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kktc-su-temin-projesinin-acilisi-gerceklestirildi-30333510. 
 
103 Hurriyet, “KKTC Su Temin Projesi'nin Açılışı Gerçekleştirildi,”, 2015. 
 
104 Sozcu, “‘KKTC Su Temin Projesi’ Hizmete Alındı,” October 17, 2015. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/ekonomi/kktc-su-
temin-projesi-aciliyor-9620 
 
27 
 
who is an academic in TRNC, affirmed his enthusiasm for this project by stating that since the 
water crisis has drastically affected both sides of the island, Turkey’s water supply could be a 
positive aspect in the negotiation period. Additionally, the water supply would enhance 
agriculture in TRNC.105 Another professor in TRNC, Ata Atun stressed out two critical points. 
First of all, he stated that the water supply would enhance the land in TRNC in such a way that 
the Turkish Cypriot land would become much more efficient than Greek Cypriot land because 
the Greek Cypriot lands are dry. Secondly, Prof. Atun affirmed that the Greek Cypriot 
administration would also need the water that comes from Turkey because they rely too much 
on desalination plants which have negative consequences on the environment.106  
Thus, at it can be seen from the statement of the state officials of Turkey and TRNC and two 
academicians of TRNC, the hope that new water project would solve the water crisis in Cyprus 
and also solve the Cypriot conflict was high. This project was interpreted as a peace project. 
Also, this would strengthen the hands of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation process. The 
fact that TRNC would develop more easily was also stressed out. These hopes relied on the fact 
that water is a vital source. In other words, clean water coming from Turkey would not only 
serve for the basic needs of the Turkish Cypriots, but it would also support industrialization and 
enhance agriculture.  
However, the hopes of Turkey and TRNC faded away because the Greek Cypriots did not 
perceive the project as a peaceful act and thus they did not want to use the water that comes 
from Turkey. Instead, right-wing Greek Cypriot politicians argued that this was a ‘third 
invasion’ of Turkey on the island. The Greek Cypriot administration also pointed out that this 
project would increase the zone of influence of Turkey on Cyprus.107  
Firstly, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Ministry claimed that the project of Turkey is a form of 
integration of TRNC and Turkey and thus this violates international law. Additionally, the 
ministry officials also claimed that; "With this action, Turkey bolsters its presence in the 
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occupied areas, not only through the ownership of the resource which will be conveyed to 
Cyprus, but also by dictating the terms of its management."108   
 After the statements of the Greek Cypriot politicians, deputy Prime Minister Recep Akdağ 
stated that the Greek Cypriot officials had no intention to collaborate with TRNC on the water 
issue. Even, he stated that “There are some (…) Greek Cypriot politicians and leading figures 
who say they would rather drink poison than Turkish water”.109 
 
2.4. The Impact of the Project 
 
 
The outcome of the project could be divided into two categories. The first impact is the effect 
of the water project on the negotiation process. The second impact is the effect of this project 
on TRNC for their development.  
In the first part, it could be stated that even after the change in agents and their wish to find a 
solution to the conflict, the incentive could not be a steppingstone for mediation because of the 
given structure that comes from the past and shapes the current structure today. This structure 
is formed of circumstances that shape and control the actions of the actors which also shape the 
way of the negotiation process. 
After the project of water pipeline started, it could be seen that the Greek Cypriot discourse was 
not as predicted. The Ministry of Foreign affairs of RoC concluded that “an overarching strategy 
to tackle issues such as the island’s water supply problems can be forged only after 
reunification.”110 Additionally, the Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades also stated that, “A 
Cyprus settlement, reached as quickly as possible, will assist not only in Israeli (gas export) 
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planning, but also contribute greatly to restoring relations with Turkey.”111 Thus, even though 
the Greek Cypriots rely on few water desalination plants for water supply, they are not willing 
to admit the water supply that comes from Turkey. 112 Although agents were positive about the 
mediation process, the Greek Cypriot officials did not see this occasion as an incentive. Since 
both parties want to increase their political gains in the negotiation process, the Greek Cypriot 
officials do not want to increase the political hands of the Turkish Cypriots by accepting to share 
the water.  
Additionally, another reason for this stance of the Greek Cypriot officials is that sharing the 
water that comes from Turkey with the Turkish Cypriots might be interpreted as partly 
recognizing them. “In Greek Cypriot discourse, cooperation with any institution in the North, 
including its academic institutions, constitutes ‘recognition by implication’, meaning that 
although doors opened in the island, these were not doors that connected Turkish Cypriots to 
the world.”113 Thus, this manner of the Greek Cypriot officials is a practice that stems from the 
past and impacts the structure of the negotiation process today. In the previous chapter, this 
discourse of the Greek Cypriots were also seen throughout the negotiation process. More 
elaborately, the Greek Cypriot officials see the Turkish Cypriots as a minority of the Republic 
of Cyprus. Thus, throughout history, they have refrained from any action that could be 
implicated as a partial recognition of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, it was no surprise that the 
Greek Cypriots did not perceive the water that comes from Turkey as ‘peace water’.  
Additionally, throughout history, the Greek Cypriots have been reluctant to accept solutions that 
proposed equal political rights with Turkish Cypriots. This stance of the Greek Cypriots reached 
a peak with the 2004 Annan Referendum because after the Greek Cypriot officials accepted this 
plan, they asked their citizens to vote against the Annan Plan. This choice of the Greek Cypriot 
officials could be interpreted as the Greek Cypriots are trying to increase their political power 
in the mediation process as much as possible. At the same time Turkish Cypriots want to have 
equal representation with the Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, here it can be 
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argued that in order to gain as much as power in the negotiation process, both sides prefer to 
increase their political gains rather than economic gains. This is a circumstance that comes from 
the past and still influences the negotiation process today. Since accepting the water that comes 
from Turkey would increase the hands of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation process, Greek 
Cypriots officials did not accept the water.  
The second part of the impacts is mainly about the arguments of how the project impacts TRNC. 
After the Republic of Cyprus became a full member of the EU, the Turkish Cypriot officials 
understood that they also need to increase their political gains. Thus, if the Turkish Cypriots use 
the water as planned than they can economically enhance which would make them politically 
stronger in the negotiation process. 
Also, with the entrance of the Greek Cypriots to the European Union, it could be interpreted that 
their main aim is to put pressure on the Turkish Cypriots, so that they will have no other choice 
than to accept being a minority in the Republic of Cyprus. This occasion showed Turkey that 
they need another strategy against the Greek Cypriot strategy of putting pressure on Turkish 
Cypriots. Thus, it can also be argued that the Turkish politicians aimed to make TRNC stronger 
so that they can develop and stand on their own so that they will not have to give up their demand 
of a bi-communal and bi-zonal republic of Cyprus.114  
As stated before, the water supply of Turkey will be used for industries, agriculture and other 
purposes. Thus, it can be analyzed that Turkish support will help the Turkish Cypriots to develop 
TRNC as much as possible in order to be able to cope against the pressures of Greek Cypriots 
and eventually stand on their own.  
All in all, at first the water project did not give TRNC an incentive because the Greek Cypriots 
did not want to use the water that comes from Turkey. On the contrary, it cannot be denied that 
this project will have long-term benefits for TRNC because it will help them develop their 
industries and agriculture. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The problem of water scarcity in Cyprus is a vital problem. Water is not only the basis of basic 
human needs but is also crucial regarding development. Without water, industries cannot work, 
and agricultural production stops. Throughout history, the island of Cyprus always had water 
shortages. Even though several measures have been taken such as building dams and 
constructing desalination plants, the water supply has still decreased. In order to solve this 
problem, Turkey initiated a water pipeline project that would connect a dam in Turkey and 
TRNC. At first, Turkish politicians, TRNC politicians and academics believed that this could 
give the Turkish Cypriots an incentive in the negotiation process of the Cypriot Conflict. 
However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the water supply even though they have been going 
through a problem of water scarcity. As it was also seen in the historical chapter, the Greek 
Cypriots have been reluctant towards a common solution which proposed political (For example 
rejection of Annan Plan in 2004). Even when the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960, they 
did not want to share the administration with the Turkish Cypriots, and this has caused severe 
problems between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Thus, it can be analyzed that the 
aim of the Greek Cypriots is to include the Turkish Cypriots into the Republic of Cyprus as a 
minority group. In order to achieve their aim, they have refrained and are refraining from any 
action that could be interpreted as partial recognition of the Turkish Cypriot administration. 
Thus, the impact of the past circumstances on the current structure and its limitations on the 
agents’ actions can be observed. Hence, a vital problem such as the water problem has not 
brought the two communities together. Nevertheless, the pipeline that comes from Turkey will 
enhance development in TRNC, and so the Greek Cypriots will not be able to achieve their plan 
of excluding TRNC from the international arena. If TRNC manages to enhance its development 
and stands on its own, then naturally increase its bargaining power in the negotiations of the 
Cypriot conflict.  
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CHAPTER 3: HYDROCARBON DISCOVERIES IN THE EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN: THE CASE OF CYPRUS 
 
 
 
 
As the world population is increasing, the energy demand of the world is also increasing. Fossil 
fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal are the most used primary energy sources.115 However, 
in the recent years, new reserves of natural gas have been found in different parts of the world. 
One of these discoveries was made in the Eastern Mediterranean. In March 2010, “U.S. 
Geological Survey estimated 122 trillion cubic feet (around 3455 bcm) of recoverable natural 
gas in the Levant Basin Province using a geology-based assessment methodology”116. This has 
created new geopolitics of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean Region.  In this chapter, 
emphasis will be given on recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
changing geopolitics of Cyprus with new explorations of new gas fields in Aphrodite. When 
Mustafa Akıncı was elected as the new President of TRNC he emphasized that natural gas 
exploration could be an incentive for a negotiation. He stressed this emphasis by the words,  
“Natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean has created a new dynamic for a solution 
to the Cyprus problem. Instead of fighting over the natural gas that has not yet been 
extracted to the surface, it is the most rational, fastest and least costly way to agree 
on how to share the wealth and with a solution together to move this gas to Europe 
via Turkey. The natural gas wealth beneath our seas, the 9,000 square kilometers of 
territory of this island, the water that we expect to come to the island from Turkey 
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– all taking into consideration of Turkish Republic authorities – we should show the 
ability to share these in equitable measures.”117 
The new explorations in Israel and Cyprus can contribute to diversification efforts of the 
European Union and Turkey but the geopolitics in Cyprus is very complicated because of the 
long-lasting Cyprus conflict. Therefore, it is vital to tackle with the question of whether these 
recent hydrocarbon findings pave the way to negotiation in the Cyprus conflict. While tackling 
with this issue, the circumstances that come from the past will also be noticed since they have 
an impact on the negotiations today. These circumstances also appear as a hurdle for resources 
to be an incentive in the negotiation process.  
 
3.1. The Importance of Natural Gas 
 
 
Natural Gas is the youngest fossil fuel, and thus it is becoming a popular primary energy 
resource. This energy resource is mostly used for electricity generation. Other essential 
characteristics of natural gas are that it burns more cleanly and efficiently compared to other 
fossil fuels and thus, generates fewer CO2 emissions per unit of energy it produces and induces 
lower non-carbon emissions such as pollutants.118 Another advantage of natural gas is that it 
requires minimal processing before its use. Also, there are abundant global gas reserves and 
discoveries are being made in the recent years.119  
Compared to other fossil fuels, the capital costs for building power plants for natural gas is 
relatively low, it is quicker, and it also has an inherent ability to respond quickly to demand 
changes. Another important characteristic of natural gas it that it can also be used as the crucial 
backup capacity for renewable power plants.120 
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Considering these benefits of natural gas, it is evident that demand for different natural gas 
markets is rising. More precisely, according to the Gas Report published by International Energy 
Agency (IEA) in 2017, natural gas demand will grow more than other fossil fuels in the 
upcoming five years because of its advantages stated above.121 
Table 1: Natural Gas Demand by Region in the New Policies Scenario (Bcm)122 
As it can be seen from the table above, natural gas demand will rise almost all over the world. 
In 2016, demand was 3635 billion cubic meters (bcm), and it is projected that in 2025, the annual 
gas demand will rise to 4174 bcm and until the year 2040, there will be an additional demand 
of 1130 bcm of natural gas. This shows that the demand for natural gas will rise, and it also 
implies that the world will need more gas supply. In other words, as demand for natural gas is 
increasing, various gas explorations and production are becoming more essential.  However, as 
stated before, there are abundant global natural gas reserves in specific regions, and also there 
are numerous undiscovered gas reserves in the various parts of the world. This shows that the 
                                                          
121 “Gas 2O17 / Analysis and Forecasts to 2O22 / Executive Summary,” 2017. Gas 2O17 / Analysis and Forecasts to 2O22 / 
Executive Summary. International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/gas2017MRSsum.pdf. 
 
122 “World Energy Outlook,” International Energy Agency, 2017: 339. 
 
35 
 
importance of natural gas will continue in the coming decades. The chart below depicts the share 
of natural gas reserves. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Proven Reserves123 
The pie diagrams above illustrate that the proven natural gas reserves have risen in an important 
amount since 1996. As it can be seen, in 1996 total natural gas reserves were 123.5 trillion cubic 
meters (tcm) which have risen to 158.2 tcm in 2006 and reached 186.6 tcm in 2016. The numbers 
are still rising with new gas discoveries. This indicates that fossil fuels will not lose its 
importance in the energy mix of various countries. Also, in the chart, it can be seen that most of 
these reserves are in the Middle East and Europe& Eurasia regions.  
Furthermore, a specific focus should be given to the natural gas demand of the European Union. 
As it is shown in table 1, according to the 2040 projections, the natural gas demand of the EU 
will decrease in a very small percentage (2%). More precisely, the natural gas demand of the 
European Union was 463 bcm in 2016. According to the projections, the demand will be 461 
bcm in 2025, 467 bcm in 2030, 469 bcm in 2035 and 454 bcm in 2040. Thus, it can be seen that 
the European Union will still have a high demand for natural gas.  
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Table 2: Natural Gas Trade by Region in the New Policies Scenario124 
The table above shows that the European Union is heavily dependent on natural gas imports. 
Additionally, the net import will be -389 bcm by 2040. This means that the net imports of natural 
gas in the European Union will rise to 84% by 2040. These facts show that the European Union 
is the biggest importer of natural gas in the world and it also shows that the import dependency 
of the Community to natural gas will increase significantly due to low gas production. 
Table 3: Main Origin of Primary Energy Imports of the EU Between 2005-2015125 
As it can be seen from the table above, the main gas exporters to the EU are Russia, Norway, 
and Algeria. After the Ukrainian crisis in 2006 and 2009, the Union aimed to diversify its 
imports of natural gas from Russia. The reason for this was to decrease its dependence on 
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Russian imports. In these two crises, Russia cut supply to Ukraine. Since Ukraine is a transit 
country which carries Russian gas to Europe, European countries were severely affected by the 
gas disruptions.126 After the two Ukrainian crises, energy security became one of the priority 
issues on the EU’s agenda. At this point, it should be noted that; “The security of the EU’s 
primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are concentrated 
among relatively few partners. Almost two thirds (64.1 %) of the EU-28’s imports of natural 
gas in 2015 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria”127. 
To come back to the Cyprus problem, on March 2010, the U.S. geological survey stated that 
they are projecting undiscovered natural gas reservoirs in the Levant Basin in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The Levant basin is shown in the map below. More elaborately the survey 
estimated that “For undiscovered gas, the total mean volume is 122,378 billion cubic feet of gas 
(BCFG), with a range from 50,087 BCFG to 227,430 BCFG”128 This amount is a necessary 
amount for countries in the region to meet their gas demand. Thus, exploration of hydrocarbon 
in the Eastern Mediterranean became more important because of the export potential of Cyprus 
and Israel. This also has an implication on the geopolitics of Cyprus. Even though some gas was 
found after this survey, gas exploration activities are continuing. However, before going into 
further details of gas explorations and proven reserves, the problems regarding the geopolitics 
of Cyprus should be analyzed. In other words, there are considerable amount of discovered and 
undiscovered natural gas reserves in the Levant region, but the potential cannot be used because 
of the problems of territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
between Turkey, TRNC, and Greek Cypriot administration.  
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Figure 2: Levant129 
 
3.2. Territorial Waters 
 
 
The problem of Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea also emerged between Turkey and Cyprus in the 
Mediterranean Sea after the hydrocarbon discovery activities began in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
There are three critical issues of the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea that stand as an 
obstacle in the hydrocarbon issue. These could be explained as Territorial Waters, Continental 
Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zone.  
Before the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the maximum 
breadth of the territorial waters of states was limited to 3 nautical miles (NM). After the 
convention in the year 1958, states decided to extend their territorial waters, even though the 
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convention did not particularly state the maximum breadth of the territorial waters. In this 
respect, in 1971, some countries including Greece decided to extend its territorial breadth to 12 
NM.130  
12 NM would create a problem in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey due to close 
location of Greek islands to Turkish coasts.  “At present, the breadth of the territorial sea of both 
Turkey and Greece in the Aegean is six nautical miles”.131 However, Greece wants to extend its 
territorial water borders to 12 NM, disadvantaging Turkey in the Aegean Sea. More elaborately,  
“At present, due to its many islands, Greek territorial waters make up about 40% of 
the Aegean Sea. In the case of 12 nautical miles wide territorial waters, the ratio 
rises to over 70%. In the case of extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, 
Turkey’s territorial waters remain less than 10% of the Aegean Sea while the size 
of the high seas falls from 51% to 19%.”132 
If Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 NM, the Turkish ships and other vessels would need 
to take permission from Greece in order to get out of the Turkish Straits to the Aegean Sea. 
Thus, considering that Turkey has a vast coastline in the Aegean Sea, if territorial waters are 
valid in line with the Greek argument, then Turkey will be ‘stuck in the stairs’.133 Thus, it can 
be seen that Greece’s claims in the Aegean Sea is unilaterally biased and it deprives Turkey’s 
fundamental rights in the Aegean Sea. 
For many years, Turkey has been urging Greece to negotiate with Turkey to find an equitable 
solution for both countries interests134. However, this problem is still an ongoing issue between 
Turkey and Greece. At present, Greece has not been able to increase its territorial waters to 12 
NM yet. 
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Figure 3: Territorial Waters in the Aegean Sea135 
 
3.3. Continental Shelf 
 
 
Regarding the debate on the continental shelf, Turkey and Greece have two choices to define 
the continental shelf. The first option is that the continental shelf division will be based between 
the coast of Turkey and coast of Greek islands. The second option is that it will be based between 
the Greek mainland and Turkish mainland.136 At this point, it should be noted that the Greek 
islands are distributed in various areas around the Aegean Sea, and some of these islands such 
as Rhodes, Kos, Chios, and Lesbos are very close to the Coast of Turkey. Thus, this creates a 
problem of continental shelf because if continental shelf would start from the Greek islands, 
then Turkey would have almost no space of continental shelf. However, the Greek officials 
justify their claims by giving reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas 
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(UNCLOS) in 1995.137 According to this treaty, coastal states have exclusive rights over their 
continental shelf which has a minimum breadth of 200 NM. Additionally, “all islands have a 
right to territorial waters, a contiguous zone, an Exclusive Economic Zone and a Continental 
Shelf.” 138 Thus, the Greeks argue that the continental shelf agreement should be based on the 
principle of equidistance/median line “between the coast of Greek islands across Turkey and the 
Turkish coast.”139 
In contrast, Turkish officials argue that the arguments of the Greek side are invalid because the 
Greek islands are located in the continental shelf of Turkey. Thus, Turkey claims that the median 
line method that Greece claims cannot be applied in the Aegean Sea between the Greek islands 
and the Turkish coasts. More elaborately, the distance between some Greek islands in the 
Aegean Sea and the Turkish coast is 3 NM. For this reason, they argue that this leaves a very 
little space for Turkey in the Aegean Sea if they recognize the continental shelf of Greece 
starting from the Greek islands and rocks. Instead, Turkey argues that the median line should be 
drawn between the Greek coast and Turkish coast.140 In this context, the map below depicts 
Turkey’s perception of the continental shelf.  
Figure 4: Median Line According to Turkish Side141 
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As it can be seen from the map above, if the Greek islands are not included in the continental 
shelf, Turkey and Greece would have an equal amount of rights over the Aegean Sea. However, 
as it can also be seen from the map, the Greek islands (yellow ones) are very close to the Turkish 
coast. Consequently, it is seen that if the continental shelf of Greece would start from the Greek 
islands than Turkey would be deprived of its rights in the Aegean Sea.  
All in all, the reason why the issue of territorial waters and continental shelf is essential in the 
Aegean Sea is that this issue also affects the problems in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
More elaborately, if Turkey accepts the territorial water and continental shelf claims of Greece 
in the Aegean Sea, then it would also have to accept the EEZ perception of Greece and Greek 
Cypriots in the Mediterranean Sea. This would deprive Turkey of basic rights in the 
Mediterranean Sea. More elaborate information about how territorial issue in the Aegean Sea 
affects the EEZ claims in Eastern Mediterranean will be given in the latter parts. 
 
3.4. Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
 
Before explaining Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the difference between this concept and 
the continental shelf should be elaborated. EEZ involves the water column and the seabed 
whereas the Continental Shelf accommodates only the soil and subsoil142. In 1982, in the 
Maritime law of the sea, the United Nations put forward the concept of EEZ. According to this 
law;  
“The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights 
and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are 
governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.”143 
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In Article 57 of Chapter V, it is stated that the exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 
200 NM from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.144 Also, 
according to the treaty, countries which have not signed this law should sign bilateral treaties. 
Turkey has not signed this convention because these laws could not be applied to the Aegean 
Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. 
In the Aegean Sea, there is a narrow sea space between Greece and Turkey, more elaborately, 
the sea miles are lower than 200 NM. Therefore, this creates a problem between Turkey and 
Greece like in territorial waters and continental shelf issues in the Aegean Sea. The Aegean Sea 
dispute has an implication to EEZ of the Mediterranean Sea. The Greek Cypriots and Greece 
have a different perspective of the EEZ in Eastern Mediterranean than the Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriots perspective of the EEZ. Below, there are two different maps which depict different 
arguments of Turkish and Greek sides. 
Figure 5: Exclusive Economic Zone from Greek Perspective145 
As is can be seen on the map above, the Greek side has left very little space for Turkey in the 
Southeastern part of the Aegean Sea because Greek side used 12 NM as a base. Other than that, 
Greek Cypriot administration defines their EEZ by taking the median of EEZ of Greek islands, 
Egypt and Turkey. As a result, it can clearly be seen from the map above that the Greek Cypriots 
and Greeks claim much greater EEZ for themselves. Here it should also be noted that the Greek 
                                                          
144 “Preamble to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 2018. 
 
145 "Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts," International Crisis Group. March 22, 2013. 
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2013/03/22/can-gas-save-cyprus-the-long-term-cost-of-frozen-conflicts/  
44 
 
Cypriots signed EEZ delamination agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel 
(2010).146 
Figure 6: Continental Shelf Agreement Between Turkey and TRNC147 
On the 21st of September 2011, Turkey and TRNC signed a continental shelf agreement which 
creates a borderline between the Northern Coast of Cyprus and the Southern Coast of Turkey 
based on international law. This continental shelf agreement was actually a reaction to the 
drilling process started by the Greek Cypriots.148 This was a response to EEZ agreement between 
Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration. 
Figure 7: Exclusive Economic Zone from Turkish Perspective149 
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It should be noted that the maximum width of the Mediterranean Sea does not exceed 
approximately 300 NM. From the map above, it can be seen that Turkey defines its EEZ by 
taking the median of Turkish and Egyptian coasts. Other than that, as stated before, in the 
territorial waters issue in the Aegean Sea, Turkey gives the 6 NM to Rhodes, Karpathos and 
other islands for the determination of the EEZ. Besides, Turkey also gives 6 NM to 
Southwestern part of Cyprus. 
Moreover, the EEZ plays a very crucial role in the energy politics of the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Cyprus issue because in 2007 and 2014 the Greek Cypriots opened the EEZ zones to 
international firms for offshore exploration activities.150 Turkish officials stated that this action 
could not be acceptable because there was an overlapping claim on EEZ between Turkey and 
the Greek Cypriots. Thus, the hydrocarbon exploration in these areas has created a clash of 
interest between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots.151  
 
3.5. The Beginning of Gas Discoveries 
 
 
The most significant discovery in Israel was the Leviathan field. The discovery was made in 
2010 by the firms Noble Energy, Delek Drilling, Avner Oil and Ratio Oil. In October 2012, it 
was estimated that this field had 17 tcf which means 491 bcm and it was also estimated that 
other smaller fields would have a total of 190 bcm152. After this occasion, in December 2010, 
Israel agreed on EEZ with the Greek Cypriot Administration. The maritime border agreement 
with Israel provided support for the Greek Cypriot Administration to start drilling at the 
Aphrodite gas field in block 12, which was licensed to American energy company Noble Energy 
in 2008.153  
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After the natural gas discovery in Israel, on December 2011, another natural gas field was 
discovered on the Aphrodite field in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. The firm Nobel 
estimated that this field had 198 bcm of natural gas but Noble’s partner, Delek, estimated that 
the natural gas reserves were around 147 bcm154. At first, the amount of the discovered fields 
seemed inefficient to do further exploration of hydrocarbons, but after the enormous potential 
of the Zohr field of Egypt was discovered by Eni, energy companies decided to continue their 
hydrocarbon exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.155 In this respect, Eni decided 
to make drilling in Block 6 and Block 3 in Cypriot EEZ. Other than Eni, ExxonMobil and Qatar 
Petroleum also decided to make drilling in Block 10 of Cypriot EEZ.156  
What is essential about this exploration activities are that as stated before, according to the U.S. 
geological survey, there is a greater potential for natural gas in the Mediterranean field. Thus, if 
the higher potential is found, they could be combined with the recent findings. This would make 
the Eastern Mediterranean a more significant supplier of natural gas. That is why exploratory 
drillings in the Eastern Mediterranean are very important, and that is why the problem of the 
EEZ is becoming a more crucial problem in the Cypriot conflict. 
 
3.6. The Stances of the Different Sides on the Hydrocarbon Discoveries 
 
 
The recent gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean raised two important questions. The first 
question is; Who has right to do explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean? The second question 
is; Do Greek Cypriots need to share revenues from hydrocarbon exploration with Turkish 
Cypriots?  
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To start of with the Greek Cypriots perspective, the officials base their right of exploration of 
the hydrocarbons on the multilateral agreements on the EEZ and also on UN law of maritime.157 
Here it should be noted that the Greek Cypriots signed EEZ delamination agreements with Egypt 
(2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010).158 Thus, the Greek Cypriot officials basically state 
that they have the rights to conduct explorations.  
In response to the second question, the Greek Cypriot officials state that they can share the 
revenues that come from hydrocarbon explorations with Turkish Cypriots only if the conflict on 
Cyprus resolves. At first, Greek Cypriot officials stated that they were ready to share the 
hydrocarbon findings and they even stated that these might be a steppingstone into a solution 
for the Cyprus conflict.159 However, the Greek Cypriot government was criticized by the 
opposition and the citizens. This led to a change in the rhetoric of the government. With the new 
rhetoric, the Greek Cypriot officials stated that it is difficult to talk about sharing the revenues 
before finding a solution to the Cypriot problem.160  
At this point, the Turkish Cypriot stance was actually quite different. Instead of differentiating 
the two factors of the right to explore hydrocarbons and sharing the revenues, the Turkish 
Cypriots took these issues as a whole, and they based their argument on the agreements on 1960. 
According to this agreement, the Greek Cypriots need to share the sovereignty as well as the 
revenues of the hydrocarbon findings with them. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots officials 
pointed out that, the Greek Cypriots do not have a right to engage in hydrocarbon exploration 
discussions without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots161. 
At this point, Turkey is concerned with the hydrocarbon discovery activities of the Greek 
Cypriots because they assert that Greek Cypriots violate the EEZ of Turkey. Also, Turkey 
stresses out that the Greek Cypriot administration does not have a right to represent the island 
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has a whole. Consequently, Turkey is concerned with the Turkish Cypriots’ rights in the 
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in Cyprus.162 More elaborately,  
“Turkey also says that the Turkish Cypriots, or equivalently the TRNC, have 
‘inherent equal rights and interests’ in the maritime zones of Cyprus. Thus, from 
Turkey’s point of view, the EEZ delimitation agreements between what is 
internationally regarded as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Egypt, Lebanon and 
Israel have no validity as they have been signed by the Greek Cypriots alone with 
disregard for the Turkish Cypriots’ equal rights.”163  
This means that Turkey does not recognize the hydrocarbon exploration of Greek Cypriot 
administration because they do not represent the whole island. In this respect, Turkey argues 
that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the maritime zones and natural resources of Cyprus is 
overseen164. 
Figure 8: Exclusive Economic Zone Claimed by Cyprus165 
As it can be seen from the map, Turkey claims a portion of numbers 1,4,5,6 and 7 of the alleged 
EEZ of Greek Cypriots. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriot administration claimed that these 
parts belong to Greek Cypriot EEZ. 
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3.7. Gas Discoveries in Cyprus 
 
 
Even though there are overlapping interests in the EEZ’s, Greek Cypriot administration violated 
the EEZ of Turkey by giving licenses for hydrocarbon exploration activities to international 
energy companies. In order to search for any potential of hydrocarbon in the EEZ of Greek 
Cypriots, they opened the EEZ for a two-dimensional seismic study in 2006 and a three-
dimensional seismic study in 2007.166 After these studies, the Greek Cypriot administration 
opened first exploration licensing round in the period February- August 2007. However, blocks 
13 and 3 were not searched in the first round. At the end of August, Noble Energy International 
was granted a license to search the block number 12 in 2008. Additional seismic searches were 
initiated in 2009.167  
As stated before, a critical point in the hydrocarbon discovery happened when Turkish-Israeli 
relations deteriorated in 2010. In the same year, Israel signed the EEZ delamination agreement 
with the Greek Cypriot administration which paved the way for Noble Energy to start its first 
exploratory drilling in Block 12. There was a giant natural gas field found in the Leviathan field 
of Israel. Block 12 is very close to the Leviathan field.168 “In December 2011 Noble announced 
the discovery of the Aphrodite field with a mean potential of 3-6 Tcf”.169 However, after the 
second drilling process, it was stated that the potential of the field could not exceed 5 Tcf. 
Afterwards, no more drilling was done in the area.170 
In reaction to licensing of Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey gave response by giving license 
to Turkish national energy company TPAO to make drilling in Block 3 in 2011. This stems from 
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the fact that Ankara argues that Block 3 lies on the EEZ of Turkish Cypriots rather than Greek 
Cypriots.171 
After the potential of the Aphrodite field was discovered, in February 2012, the Greek Cypriot 
administration decided to initiate a second round of licensing. There was a high number of 
interest, and after negotiations, the Greek Cypriot administration decided to authorize 
exploratory drilling in blocks 2,3,9,10 and 11. The blocks, 2,3 and 9 were granted to ENI Cyprus 
Ltd. and KOGAS Cyprus Ltd Consortium. The firm TOTAL E&P Cyprus B.V. was granted the 
licenses of Blocks 10 and 11.172  
In 2014, the second exploratory drilling resumed in block 9. However, after two processes of 
drillings, there was no gas found. Even, ENI stopped the exploration process. This occasion also 
discouraged French company TOTAL from conducting exploration activities in the blocks 10 
and 11.173 
In 2016 the Greek Cypriot administration decided to grant licenses for blocks 6,8 and 10 which 
would be the third round of exploration licensing. After several negotiations it was decided that 
ENI Cyprus Ltd. /Total E&P Cyprus B.V. would be responsible for Block 6; ENI Cyprus Ltd. 
was granted Block 8; and Exxon Mobil Exploration and Production Cyprus (Offshore) Ltd. 
Qatar Petroleum International Upstream O.P.C. were selected to start the operations in block 
10.174  
 
3.8. Geopolitics of Recent Gas Findings 
 
 
As stated before, ENI got exploration license from Greek Cypriots in 2012 while Turkey granted 
license to TPAO to make exploration in Block 3 earlier than Greek Cypriot administration. In 
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February 2018, when ENI started drilling activities in Block 3, Turkish warships gave a response 
by blocking ENI drilling vessels near block 3. This is because Turkish side claims that Block 3 
belongs to EEZ of Turkish Cypriots. After this incident, the vessels of ENI left Block 3 in order 
to not to fuel the dispute.175  
Besides ENI, in March 2018, two ExxonMobil vessels began explorations in block 10 which is 
in the southwestern part of EEZ of Republic of Cyprus. Even though Turkey kept ENI vessel 
out of Block 3, it could not do the same thing for ExxonMobil vessels. In fact, Turkey has no 
claims on block 10, but it expressed its concerns about unilateral drilling decision of the Greek 
Cypriot administration. Turkey could not block ExxonMobil vessels because the U.S. Navy 6th 
fleet ships escorted to ExxonMobil vessels and the U.S. warships conducted exercise near 
Cyprus. Consequently, it was not possible for Turkish warships to block ExxonMobil vessels. 
Rather than blocking, Turkish side warned the U.S. against sending its 6th fleet to Mediterranean 
region.176 
The presence of U.S. Navy ships to protect drilling vessels in the Mediterranean caused 
deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the U.S.. Protection of drilling vessels by the 
U.S. Navy demonstrates that the U.S. recognizes EEZ of the Greek Cypriot administration and 
it will protect the interests of ExxonMobil by using force if Turkey attempts to intercept 
American drilling vessels. The U.S. officials repeatedly voiced their support to the Greek 
Cypriot administration to make hydrocarbon drilling, but they also stated that hydrocarbon 
resources need to be shared on equal footing between the two communities.177 However, Greek 
Cypriots are not willing to share hydrocarbon resources with Turkish Cypriots. The main proof 
of this is a change in the rhetoric of Greek Cypriots as stated earlier. At first, they agreed to 
share revenues with Turkish Cypriots, but then they changed their decision.178 Other than that, 
Greek Cypriots took unilateral decisions both to make hydrocarbon drilling and giving licenses 
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to international energy companies to make drilling. This shows that backed by the European 
Union and the United States, Greek Cypriots try to maximize its gains as possible.  
As stated earlier, the natural gas discoveries of Noble Energy and its partners in Leviathan field 
in Israel led to natural gas discoveries in Aphrodite field in Cyprus in 2012. Leviathan field has 
the capacity of 621 bcm.179 As it can be seen in the figure, there is only 7 km between Leviathan 
and Aphrodite fields. Besides, Italian energy company found gas in Zohr field in Egypt. The 
hydrocarbon reservoir has the total capacity of 850 bcm.180 As seen from the map below, there 
is only 90 km between Aphrodite field and Zohr field. Therefore, it was not surprising for Noble 
Energy to find gas in Aphrodite field. 
Figure 9: Gas Fields in the Eastern Mediterranean181 
Even though gas discovered in Aphrodite field, the amount of gas is not higher compared to 
Zohr and Leviathan fields. There is only roughly 120-129 bcm gas available in the Aphrodite 
field.182 Currently, residents of Cyprus do not use natural gas, and there is no gas infrastructure. 
It is expected that building gas infrastructure for gas will be costly for Cyprus because they need 
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to build pipelines to deliver gas to both industrial facilities, power plants, and homes.183 
However, gas infrastructure can decrease energy import dependency of the Greek Cypriot part. 
Besides domestic use, Cyprus can export its gas in two ways. Either through LNG or pipeline. 
Cyprus is considering export its gas to Europe. However, since the discovered gas is around 
120-129 bcm, Cyprus is waiting for new gas discoveries to export its gas.184 
Recent findings in Israel and Cyprus have created the question of whether the EU can import 
natural gas from Israel and Cyprus together. This is important because this opens a door for the 
EU to find a new route to diversify Russian gas. 
With the planned construction of Vassilikos LNG facilities, Cyprus aims to export LNG by the 
end of 2019.185However, without new discoveries, it will not be cost competitive for Cyprus to 
export its gas in the form of LNG. Cyprus can export its gas to three countries via pipeline. 
These countries are Egypt, Greece, and Turkey.186 
In 2017, Egypt and Cyprus agreed to start negotiations to build a pipeline between Egypt and 
Cyprus. Egypt wants to buy as much as gas possible from the newly found Aphrodite field. The 
plan of Egypt is to buy Cypriot gas, convert it to LNG and to sell to Europe.187 Since a great 
amount of gas discovered in Zohr field of Egypt, Egypt will combine its gas with Cypriot gas 
and sell it to European countries. However, construction of a pipeline is costlier then LNG in 
Cyprus because of the very long undersea routes of the pipeline. At present, the export capacity 
of Egypt cannot be calculated given its rising domestic gas demand.188 
In 2017, the governments of Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy signed a joint declaration for the 
implementation of Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP). The length of the pipeline is over 
2000 km, and majority part of the pipeline will cross underwater. The project is designed to 
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carry 12-16 bcm gas from Leviathan and Aphrodite fields to Greece and then to Italy. 
Considering its long undersea route, the costs of the pipeline is high compared to other available 
options (LNG and pipeline to Turkey).189 However, in 2015, the EU prioritized the project under 
Project of Common Interest (PCI), and feasibility studies are being made. The main aim of the 
PCI is to develop projects that will strengthen energy links and infrastructure of European 
countries.190 The European Union gives special attention to the project because the project can 
help the EU to diversify its energy suppliers and secure its energy supply.191 It is worth to remind 
that Cyprus will able to supply gas thanks to Israeli gas export capacity. Without Israeli gas 
export, Cypriot gas remains insignificant. 
Another possible route is a direct pipeline between Israel and Turkey in which Cyprus supplies 
its gas to that pipeline. It is the cheapest and shortest pipeline compared to Egypt- Cyprus 
pipeline and EastMed pipeline.192 At present, Turkey and the European Union have connected 
gas infrastructures and pipelines. Additionality, new pipelines are being built, and they will be 
in service until 2020. These are Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) pipelines. TANAP has 16 bcm capacity whereas TAP has 10 bcm capacity, and they will 
carry Azeri gas to Europe. Since there will be existing infrastructure, it will be less costly for 
both Israel and Cyprus to deliver their gas to Turkey and then to Europe.193  
The proposed pipeline can only pass through two routes. In the first route, the pipeline can pass 
from EEZ of Syria and Lebanon, and in the second route, the pipeline can pass from EEZ of 
Cyprus.194 Considering hostile relations between Israel and Arab countries, the first route is not 
viable for the pipeline. In the second route, the proposed pipeline needs to pass from EEZ of 
Cyprus. However, Cyprus could be reluctant to give permission for the passage of the proposed 
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pipeline. This stems from the tense relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. Noble 
is the operator of Aphrodite field together with its Israeli partner Delek company. The latter 
company insists on the construction of a pipeline to Egypt and Turkey, and they are reluctant 
for the construction of LNG facilities in Cyprus.195 Relatively low costs for the construction of 
the pipeline and available infrastructure to export gas to Europe makes Turkish route more 
profitable to both Cyprus and Israel. Even though Turkish route is one of the economically 
viable options, Cyprus expresses their support on EastMed pipeline while Israel remains 
indecisive. This is because political interests dominate economic interests. The same case was 
seen in the second chapter of the thesis. The parties have political concerns and therefore they 
prefer to choose economically more costly options in order to increase their political gains. 
In the regional context, Russia was totally against the construction of the pipeline that goes to 
Turkey and Europe because Russia is the greatest gas supplier to the EU and it wants to protect 
its market share in Europe. As stated before, after the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises, the EU 
started to reconsider its dependence on a single supplier that is Russia, and they developed 
Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).196 With this corridor, the EU plans to reach gas sources from the 
Caspian, the Middle-East and the Mediterranean regions. To prevent the construction of a 
pipeline to Turkey, Russia stands on the side of the Greek Cypriot administration to fuel fraction 
between the two communities.197  
 
3.9. The Impact of Natural Gas Explorations on the Mediation Process 
 
 
The Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of TRNC regards the natural gas 
exploration as, 
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“The natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean provide a potential for 
cooperation not only between the two sides on the Island, but also among other 
actors in the region, while at the same time providing a potential for economic 
interdependence that would serve regional stability. The Greek Cypriot leadership, 
however, has opted to turn this area for potential cooperation into a source of 
regional tension by attempting to create a fait accompli.”198 
Furthermore, when Akıncı was elected as President he declared that the gas exploration 
activities could go both ways. They can be an incentive for cooperation or they could also give 
harm. He stated this as, 
 “(...)I see a big opportunity there, if treated properly, handled properly, without any 
fear of accidents [ourselves] and the others we can get mutual benefit out of it ... If 
not handled properly, you may expect accidents at any time."199 
However, the Greek Cypriot administration stated various times that the sharing of the resources 
is only available after the Cyprus conflict is settled. This stance of the Greek Cypriot officials 
could also be seen by the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RoC, Mr Ioannis 
Kasoulides, “(…) Extraordinary potentials in energy are there and could be even stronger after 
an agreement on Cyprus.”200 
Thus, both parties believe that energy resources could be an incentive for cooperation. However, 
Greek Cypriot officials argue that this cooperation could only be done after the settlement of the 
Cyprus Conflict whereas Turkish Cypriot officials believe that the resources should be used as 
an incentive for the settlement of the Conflict. Hence, the circumstances that comes from the 
past shapes the current structure of the conflict today. Here, the circumstances that come from 
the past is the fact that RoC cannot cooperate with TRNC because it will be partially recognizing 
them. Additionally, both parties want to increase their political hands in the negotiation process. 
Sharing the resource of natural gas would increase the political hands of the TRNC. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the Greek Cypriots want to use this as a tool to increase their own political 
                                                          
198 “Regarding the Natural Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of TRNC. Last modified February 13, 2018. http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/statement-regarding-natural-resources-eastern-mediterranean/ 
 
199 Al Jazeera News, “Akinci: Greek Cypriots All Talk and No Action on Reunification,”  March 13, 2018. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2018/03/akinci-greek-cypriots-talk-action-reunification-
180329094015316.html 
 
200 “The Minister of Foreign Affairs Met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy,” MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
- Republic of Cyprus. Last modified September 13, 2016. 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/CDF95BCFE095EFE8C225802D00371FB2?OpenDocument&highlight=natural 
gas. 
57 
 
gains. This stance was also seen in the previous chapter. In this respect, it can be argued that 
and this practice comes from the past and it shapes the actions of the agents today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
To put it in a nutshell, the Eastern Mediterranean has a significant potential of natural gas fields. 
However, there are ongoing disputes between Greece and Turkey on territorial waters and 
continental shelf. Also, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey have different perceptions 
of the EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean. This creates disputes in the hydrocarbon exploration 
and exploitation activities. Also, as stated in this chapter, if Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, 
Turkey, and Israel collaborate to export the gas to Europe then all of these parties would benefit 
economically from the solution. Thus, if such collaboration is done, this might be a first stepping 
stone in trying to find a solution to the Cypriot dispute. However, as stated in the historical 
analysis chapter, the Greek Cypriot administration does not want to collaborate with the Turkish 
Cypriots because they do not want to recognize them as a different community. Thus, in this 
chapter it is argued that the historical structure of the conflict limits the choices and actions of 
the agents. More elaborately, since the Greek Cypriot officials do not want to recognize TRNC 
as a different community this affects the current flow of the negotiation today.  
In this respect, the Greek Cypriot administration is using other tools that suits the circumstances 
that comes from the past to find a solution. They believe that if they do not try to negotiate by 
taking into account the claims of the Turkish Cypriots, then the Turkish Cypriots could stop 
resisting to international pressure and naturally they will except to be a minority group in the 
Republic of Cyprus. However, in this chapter, it could be seen that if the countries stated above 
collaborated in exporting the natural gas found in the Leviathan field and Aphrodite field, then 
they would all gain economic benefits. Hence, this would create an atmosphere in which the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would find an atmosphere in which they could try to solve 
the dispute. Today, both the Cypriot conflict and the hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation 
activities is an ongoing process. However, as seen in the case today it can be stated that even if 
more gas will be found this would not be an incentive for the conflict. Rather, it would increase 
58 
 
the dispute because as seen in various parts of the thesis, the different parts of the conflict find 
political gains more important than economic gains.  
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CHAPTER 4: COOPERATION VERSUS DISCORD IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
On the 23rd of March 2015, Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı and Greek Cypriot leader 
Nicos Anastasiades walked together through both sides of Nicosia. This occasion revived the 
hope for a settlement of the Cypriot conflict.201 In this respect, at the beginning of 2017, the 
Geneva negotiation rounds started. However, as in the past, these rounds could not bring a 
settlement to the Cypriot conflict. Thus, it can be inferred that after the change in agents, the 
posture of the friendship of both Cypriots leaders did not last long. There were three main factors 
which stood as an obstacle for the negotiations. These were the issues of Karpas peninsula, the 
military issue, and the question of rotating presidency.202 In this chapter, these issues have been 
elaborated. However, in order to analyze the effect of these factors on the Cypriot conflict, the 
chapter also briefly demonstrates how the increasing regional power of Turkey affects the 
geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, due to recent hydrocarbon findings in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, the importance of the region has increased. Thus, this chapter argues 
that Turkey, as a rising regional power, has a significant impact on the Cypriot conflict. Both 
the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots are trying to gain more political benefits from the 
negotiation process. After elaborating on these different issues, it can also be argued that due to 
Turkey’s regional power, the Greek Cypriots officials are trying to increase their political gains.  
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4.1. Turkey as a Regional Power 
 
 
In order to understand the place of Turkey in its region, Turkish Foreign policy will be briefly 
explained in three periods. The first period is from 2002-2010, the second period is from 2010-
2015, and the third period is from 2015-present. The most important occasions in the first period 
were the September 11 attacks and the following ‘war on terror’.203 In the first period, “Turkish 
foreign policy was shaped by soft power and active globalization.”204 Thus, Turkish foreign 
policy started to change, and Turkey started to carry out the role of a mediator. In this respect, 
the country also started to prioritize cooperation. For example, Turkey arbitrated the conflicts 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Israel and Hamas and Syria and Israel. This shows that 
instead of focusing on security by using hard power, the country started to put more emphasis 
on cooperation. Besides, Turkey also started to give importance to economic cooperation. An 
example for this is the Caucasus Platform for Economic Cooperation with Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Russia which was initiated by Turkey.205 Thus in this period, the defense 
spending of Turkey had also declined whereas Turkey’s role in the international organizations 
had increased.206 One important example for this is that in the period of 2009-2010 Turkey has 
also served in the United Nations Security Council.207 
Additionally, since 2000, Turkey has been going through a period of Europeanization. 
Therefore, in the first period, the role of Europeanization is very importation since it has affected 
the foreign policy of Turkey. In 1999, in the Helsinki summit, Turkey was granted a candidate 
status. In this respect, between 1999-2004, Turkey tried to adopt democratization and reform 
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packages.208 Besides, with Europeanization, the Turkish military’s role in the foreign policy 
decision making and also public policy making declined. Turkey started to put emphasis on 
diplomatic tools rather than other tools including hard power.209 However, this situation started 
to change in 2006, when the European Council froze 8 chapters related to the Customs Union 
and the accession negotiations could not advance. The reason for this was because of the hostile 
relations between the Greek Cypriot government and Turkey. The Council demanded Turkey to 
open its borders and airports to the Republic of Cyprus and the Council put forward that they 
would not open related chapters until Turkey fulfills its commitments. In 2007, France vetoed 
the opening of five chapters and in 2009, the Republic of Cyprus vetoed the opening of six 
chapters. In total, 19 chapters were blocked.210   
More elaborately, Turkey has been trying to consolidate its relations with the European Union 
for a very long time. Turkey applied to the EEC in 1959 as an associate member and it applied 
to the EC in 1987. However, Turkey’s application was rejected when it applied in 1987. Also, 
in the Luxembourg summit in 1997, it was stated that Turkey could not be given a candidate 
status but when Ankara suspended all relations with the EU, Turkey was given a candidate status 
in the Helsinki summit in 1999. Finally, in 2005, full membership negotiations initiated.211 
However, in 2004 Republic of Cyprus became a member of the EU which affected the 
negotiation process of Turkey.212 Thus, here it should be pointed out that Turkey is the sole 
country that is not able to become a member while it is one of the first applicants of the 
community. Therefore, Turkey started to move away from its Western orientation and its 
relationship with the European Union started to change. “The virtuous cycle of reform that 
characterized the 1999-2005 period has been replaced by a vicious cycle in which lack of 
conditionality feeds into political stagnation which in turn moves Turkey and the EU further 
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away from one another.”213 In other words, as hopes of Turkey to become a member declined, 
Turkey has moved away from aligning with the EU and also differences started to emerge in its 
foreign policy.  
The second period started with the Arab Uprisings. To put the uprisings in a nutshell, the first 
uprisings started in Tunisia as a bottom up protest against the authoritarian regimes, urging a 
more democratic form of government. Later on, these uprisings spread to other countries in the 
region. After all, these uprisings did not turn out as planned, which turned the region to an 
unstable place with internal wars and so on. In this regard, Turkey was influenced from these 
changes, which had impacted its foreign policy.214  
The third period was not very much different from the second period. The effects of the previous 
period still lasted. The most important occasions which have affected the global environment 
and Turkey were the refugee crisis, war against ISIS, problems in the MENA region and so 
on.215 By considering the environment in its immediate neighborhood in the last two periods, it 
can be stated that in such a nexus, Turkish foreign policy started to divert from soft to hard 
power. More elaborately,  
“From the war against ISIS to the creation of order and stability, from managing the 
refugee crisis to state building, the pivotal role of Turkey was perceived more in 
security terms rather than in terms of economy, culture, identity and democracy. 
Turkey’s military and geopolitical hard power capacities began to draw 
attention.”216  
All of these depict the changes in the Turkish Foreign Policy from 2010 onwards. Furthermore, 
there were also other occasions which have affected Turkey’s foreign policy and its role in the 
region. An essential turning point was the deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations. Until 
2009, Turkey and Israel had good relations. They had cooperated in many areas including 
economy and politics. Furthermore, Turkey played a significant role as a mediator in the 
conflicts between Israel-Syria and Israel- Lebanon.217 However, in 2009, the Davos crisis 
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erupted which deteriorated the relations between these two countries. Another crisis, the low 
chair crisis, took place in the next year. This crisis increased the tension between Israeli and 
Turkish officials which further deteriorated the relations between these the two countries. 
Lastly, the Mavi Marmara was an occasion in which the relations between these two countries 
deteriorated.218 This is another clear depiction of Turkey’s transformation from soft power to 
hard power. 
Since 2002, Turkey has been transforming into a regional power. Turkey’s “proactive foreign 
policy has seen it act as a pivotal state/regional power in an uncertain, insecure and globalizing 
world.”219 In other to elaborate this role of Turkey, the concept of regional power will be 
clarified. 
 In general, a regional power is a country that has economic and military capabilities and it is 
also the ability to use these capabilities to convince a sufficient number of countries in the 
region. These countries can also have the power to represent the other states in the region in 
other places and so on.220  
To start with economic capability, the chart blow shows the GDP of different countries in the 
region.  
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Figure 10: GDP of 15 Middle-East Countries221 
IMF data shows that Turkey has the greatest GDP among 15 Middle-East countries. As stated 
in the clarification in the concept of regional power, economy is one of the important factors for 
regional leadership. Thus, from the figure above it can be argued that Turkey’s power in the 
region has risen. However, again by looking at the concept of regional power, it can be seen that 
economy is only one aspect of the leadership in the region. It needs to be supported by strong 
military and other political dynamics. 
Since 1998, Turkey has modernized its army, and it has developed its defense technologies. For 
many years, Turkey used American military equipment and then the country started to produce 
its technologies from domestic sources.222 Considering that Turkey is close to unstable regions 
such as the North-Africa, the Middle-East, Caucasus and Balkans, multiple threats such as 
radical Islamism, terrorism, nuclear missile threat and regional rivalry led Turkey to develop 
and strengthen its army with the latest technologies. According to 2014 Global Power Index, 
Turkey is the strongest country among 15 Middle-East countries.223 In the latest version of the 
same index which has been published in 2018, Turkish military is still the strongest army in the 
region.224 
Turkey has had a greater GDP and military power compared to the Middle-East countries. 
Therefore, the country fulfills two conditions to become a regional power that is the ability to 
influence the region economically and militarily.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that the eruption of the Arab Spring opened a door for Turkey to 
increase its power in the region. Therefore, the country started to support revolutionary uprisings 
against the dictatorships most importantly in Egypt and Syria.225 This means that Turkey was 
                                                          
221“World Economic Outlook,” IMF. April 2018, 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/TUR/SYR/SAU/ISR/IRN/IRQ/EGY/ARE/LBN/QAT/YEM/OMN/
JOR/KWT/BHR  
 
222 Armin Rosen and Jeremy Bender, "The Most Powerful Militaries in The Middle East [RANKED]." Business Insider. 
October 27, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-middle-east-2014-8#no-2-turkey-15  
 
223 Rosen and Bender, 2014. 
 
224 "Middle Eastern Powers Ranked by Military Strength," Global Fire Power Index, 2018. 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-middle-east.asp  
 
225 Şener Aktürk, "Turkey's Role in the Arab Spring and the Syrian Conflict," Turkish Policy Quarterly,  March 14, 2017. 
http://turkishpolicy.com/article/844/turkeys-role-in-the-arab-spring-and-the-syrian-conflict  
 
65 
 
both influenced and affected by the regional affairs and it has turned its attention from Europe 
to the Middle-East. 
4.1.1. Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus 
 
 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, Turkey’s role in the Mediterranean was elaborated and in the previous 
part of this chapter, Turkey’s foreign policy and its role in the Middle east was also briefly 
shown. Both of these have an effect in the place of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 
other words, in the Eastern Mediterranean nexus, the role and zone of influence of Turkey is 
visible due to its rights in the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey’s military capabilities, economic 
capabilities and so on. Turkey’s ability to use its naval and air powers in the periphery of the 
island enables the country to control the trade from the Middle-East and the Mediterranean to 
the West, and it decreases the zone of influence of the Republic of Cyprus.226 By taking into 
consideration Turkey’s regional power and its capabilities, it is argued that Turkish military 
presence in the island put psychological pressure on Greek Cypriots. The size of the Turkish 
military in the island is three times greater than national guards of the Republic of Cyprus.227 
Considering that Turkey has the strongest army in the region, Greek Cypriots fear from Turkish 
aggression. 
Thus, it can also be asserted that when the Republic of Cyprus blocked opening accession 
chapters with Turkey together with France, Turkey moved away from aligning with the West 
and it turned to a regional power. This means that the Republic of Cyprus contributed to the 
process of transformation of Turkey from civilian power to regional power. Therefore, with the 
increase in economic and military capabilities of Turkey, the role of the country in this region 
increased. Consequently, Republic of Cyprus felt more threatened. 
As stated in the previous parts of this chapter, regarding the economy, the GDP of Turkey has 
increased, and it turned to the greatest economy in the region. The 2008 global economic crisis 
hit European countries in the 2010s. Especially, Southern European countries were severely 
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affected by the crisis. The government’s miscalculation of the budget, the collapse of the Greek 
economy, and the government’s exposure to Greek government bonds led to the collapse of the 
banking system in Cyprus in 2012-2013.228 The Republic of Cyprus is the fourth country in the 
eurozone after Ireland, Portugal, and Greece that seek a bailout. The country has recovered from 
the crisis, but high private debt and non-performing loans are the remaining challenges of the 
Cypriot economy.229 Even though the country has recovered, unemployment is still high, and 
banking system cannot support itself.230 As a result, economic problems in Cyprus increased 
security concerns of the country since Turkey turned to the biggest economy in the region. By 
being the largest economy, Turkish influence in the region has increased. Here, it can be argued 
again that the Greek Cypriots have felt threatened by the rising power of Turkey due to its 
economy. The main reason behind this argument is that if Turkey’s regional power increases in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, then its bargaining power will also increase. However, due to the 
strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and also the recent hydrocarbon discoveries, 
Greek Cypriot officials do not want a rising regional power since it would affect their political 
bargaining power in the region. Thus, as stated in Chapter 2, political bargaining power have 
become more important in the region.  
 
4.2. Obstacles to Cooperation in the Cyprus Conflict 
 
 
From the first chapter and also the second chapter of the thesis, it can be interpreted that the 
members of the European Union have used the carrot of membership to Turkey to solve the 
Cyprus problem. This can be seen because the negotiation process between the EU and Turkey 
froze in 2006 because of the Cypriot conflict.231 Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots have used 
their advantageous position that is being a member of the EU, over Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
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to put pressure on these two countries. Consequently, it can be argued that these countries are 
being suppressed by the members of the European Union in the Cyprus conflict. Multiple 
pressures are coming from the Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.  
In order to elaborate this argument, the historical process should be reminded shortly. Until the 
Annan Plan, third parties such as the U.N and the U.S., supported the idea of bi-zonal federal 
Republic of Cyprus. The Annan Plan was based on this proposal.232 After multiple rounds of 
negotiations, the Annan Plan was accepted by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. 
The last step for the negotiation was holding a referendum in both communities.233 Before this 
referendum, the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos gave a speech that the Greek Cypriot 
citizens should vote against the Annan Plan.234 The reason behind the Greek Cypriot attitude 
could be laid behind the reason on the continuing accession negotiations of Cyprus to the EU. 
More elaborately, since the Greek Cypriots officials were planning to become a member of the 
EU, they knew that they would have an advantage in the negotiations. Therefore, it could be 
interpreted that, the Greek Cypriots wanted to negotiate after they became an EU member, so 
that they could put more pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to make them join the Republic of 
Cyprus as a minority group.  
Additionally, it can be argued that the Greek Cypriot officials thought that with the membership 
card, they could also put pressure on Turkey by using its veto power. In contrast, if the Greek 
Cypriots would have accepted the Annan Plan, Cyprus would have joined the EU as a whole. 
Thus, “the crises that stopped the negotiations would probably never happen.”235 Consequently, 
this plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots whereas it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. 
This was a turning point in the Cypriot conflict because even though the Greek Cypriots were 
the ones who wasted the negotiation time, they were the ones being awarded with the 
membership of the EU.  
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The most important negotiation process after the Annan Negotiations were the recent 
conferences in Geneva in 2017. However, again in these conference series, there were problems 
which came from the past and still cannot be resolved. Even though the new leaders showed an 
attitude of willing to solve the conflict, their will and efforts could not overcome the existing 
problems coming from the past.  
First of all, territorial issues have always been an issue in the conflict between the two 
communities. In the recent rounds in Geneva, this issue came to the forefront again. One 
important territorial dispute is the one over the Karpas peninsula. Secondly, the presence of 
military troops of Turkey in TRNC have also created a problem. The last factor that will be 
examined is the issue of a rotating presidency system.  
 
4.2.1. The Issue of Karpas Peninsula  
 
 
At the Geneva conference in 2017, one of the obstacles to the solution of the Cypriot conflict 
were territorial issues. The Greek Cypriot officials claimed that before the division of the island 
in 1974, the areas of Karpas, Varosha and Morphou were mostly populated with Greek Cypriots. 
Therefore, they requested that some parts of these areas should be given back to the Greek 
Cypriots.236 However, the Karpas peninsula has a significant strategic location. 
 More elaborately, the importance of this peninsula has risen in the recent years due to the Syrian 
crisis. The aim of the PYD terror organization and its supporters is to create a Kurdish corridor 
in Syria which connects to the Mediterranean sea, so that they can conduct trade.237 It is also 
argued that the region between the Karpas peninsula, Gulf of Alexandretta and Syria is rich in 
oil and natural gas reserves.238 Thus, if the Kurdish corridor extends to the Mediterranean and 
some parts of the Karpas peninsula is taken by the Greek Cypriots, then Turkey and the Turkish 
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Cypriots will partly be deprived of its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, since the 
location of Karpas is very close to Turkey, this place also plays an important role in the security 
of Turkey.239 Thus, the Karpas area is of strategic importance to Turkey.  
Also, the problems of the continental shelf, territorial waters and exclusive economic zone 
should shortly be mentioned again here. In the previous chapter, it was explained that Greece 
and the Greek Cypriots continental shelf, territorial water, and exclusive economic zone claims 
would deprive Turkey’s rights in the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea if Turkey would accept 
these claims. One of the important reasons for this can be stated as Turkey’s increasing role as 
a regional power.  
As argued in the previous part of this chapter, Turkey’s rising influence in the region has created 
intimidation for Greek Cypriots. Additionally, with the Olive Branch operation, Turkey aims to 
block the Kurdish corridor from reaching the Mediterranean.240 Thus, here it can be analyzed 
that the rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean prevents the usage of the resources as an incentive. 
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Figure 11: Syrian Civil War Map: Who's in Control Where241 
All in all, it can be asserted that the claim of Karpas of Greek Cypriots officials is actually a 
way to decrease the role of Turkey in the region and also to decrease the political gains of 
Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, as stated in the previous chapter of energy, Turkey and TRNC 
have signed an EEZ delamination agreement which shares the right of the area between the 
North of the Karpas Peninsula and Gulf of Alexandretta.242 Here it should be reminded that the 
UNCLOS had given the right of making a bilateral agreement on the continental shelf between 
two Coastal states. Thus, by claiming the area of Karpas, it can be argued that the Greek Cypriots 
are trying to increase their influence in the Northern part of the Eastern Mediterranean. If they 
get their claims, then they can make new bilateral agreements in the region and thus increase 
their EEZ. 
 
4.2.2. Military removal of Turkey from Northern Cyprus 
 
 
Another important factor which created a problem in the Geneva conference is the presence of 
Turkish military troops in TRNC. Thus, during the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot officials 
urged Turkey to remove its military troops from the Northern part of Cyprus, and they also 
urged for the abolishment of the security treaties.243 As stated in the previous parts of the chapter, 
the Greek Cypriot officials stated that they see the presence of Turkish military in the island as 
a threat, and it is even claimed that this creates a psychological pressure on Greek Cypriots since 
the size of Turkish military in the island is three times greater than national guards of Republic 
of Cyprus.244 During the conference, representatives of Turkey stated that they could not accept 
to abolish the security guarantees under the existing treaties. Nevertheless, the representatives 
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asserted that Turkey could remove the military troops with the condition that a very small 
percentage of Greek and Turkish Cypriot troops would stay, suggesting that the deployment of 
the troops could be renewed in 15 years. However, the Greek Cypriots insisted that the Treaty 
of Guarantee should be abolished. Furthermore, they stated that a small number of troops could 
stay in the condition that a date for their deployment should be immediately set up.245 
However, based on the treaty of Alliance signed between Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom 
in 1960, Turkey is allowed to keep military troops in the Northern part of Cyprus. More 
elaborately,  
“The presence of the Turkish Army takes its legitimacy from the need to protect 
Turkish Cypriots and its legality from Article 181 of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution 
(which is still recognized as the only valid Constitution by the international 
community) as well as the Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance. Turkey maintains its 
presence to protect the Turkish Cypriot population….”246  
However, the UK still has two different military bases in two different places on the island. 
Additionally, Greece also has a military base in the Baf region.247  Nevertheless, if Turkey 
removes its troops, then it can be argued that there will be a change in the balance of power 
inside the island. Additionally, as stated before, the Cypriot conflict is one of the obstacles to 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. Even if Turkey would compromise with the troop withdrawal and 
thus give up its use of the right to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island, there is no guarantee 
for the problem to be solved. Thus, Turkey’s accession to the EU will also not be guaranteed. 
As a result, it can be analyzed that accepting this could decrease the bargaining power of Turkey. 
Finally, it can also be argued that these troops are important for the Turkish Cypriots to feel 
more secure.  
 
4.2.3. Rotating Presidency 
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During the Geneva negotiations, another important factor that could not be resolved was the 
question of the rotating presidency.248 However, in 2016 Akıncı stated:  
“A rotating presidency is one of the indispensable topics for the equality of the 
Turkish Cypriot nation. If the Greek Cypriot side says that ‘the rotating presidency 
will never be a parameter of the solution,’ then this means there will be no deal”.249 
The reason behind this statement of the Turkish Cypriot president can be because of the 
historical occasions. To elaborate, the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960 with a common 
constitution which gave both communities equal rights. For example, the division of jobs was 
based on the percentage of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot populations. Additionally, the 
President was Greek Cypriot, and the Vice President was Turkish Cypriot, and both had veto 
power which gave them equal say in politics and equal rights. Additionally, the Parliament was 
divided equally to the percentage of both groups. Even though the constitution gave equal rights, 
discord started to rise, and the Greek Cypriots tried to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from the 
government.250 Hence, the reason why the Turkish Cypriot leader wants a rotating presidency 
is to secure the Turkish Cypriot right in the government. In other words, since in the past, the 
Greek Cypriots tried to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from politics and on the other hand Turkish 
Cypriots want to guarantee their political rights.  
Furthermore, during that period, the Greek Cypriots aimed to achieve the aim of Enosis which 
was to unite with their motherland Greece. To achieve this aim, they had to be the only 
government in the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, since the 1960 constitution, they have been 
rejecting the equality of the Turkish Cypriots on the right of governing the Republic.251  
Today, with having partial objections to the issue of rotating presidency, Anastasiades argues 
that political equality in the Republic of Cyprus can be reached through other means. Moreover, 
 “Political equality, he said, was expressed through equal representation in the 
Upper House and on other issues such as judicial or quasi-judicial matters. He said 
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it would be unprecedented for a majority community to be numerically equated with 
and represented by the minority community”.252  
When he is asked about the system of guarantees, he states that there will be guarantees by the 
UN Security Council and the European Union.253 From this argument of Anastasiades, it can be 
asserted that the Greek Cypriots see the Turkish Cypriots as a minority group and so they do not 
really want the Turkish Cypriots to be involved in politics. In the quotation above, it is stressed 
that there can be equal representation in the Upper House. However, this does not really 
guarantee the political rights of the Turkish Cypriots as in rotating presidency. In the quotation, 
it is also stated that one of the guarantees will be the EU. However, from the historical occasions, 
it can be understood that the EU is not a neutral actor. Instead, they are biased because Greece 
is a member of the EU whereas Turkey is not. This is important because Greece will be able to 
keep on guaranteeing the rights of the Greek Cypriots whereas Turkey will not be able to 
guarantee the rights of the Turkish Cypriots because Turkey is not an EU member. Thus, it can 
be concluded that the rotating presidency system is one of the options for securing the right of 
Turkish Cypriots in the government. As stated before, the Turkish Cypriots do not want to be 
seen as a minority community and they want to have a place in the government of the Republic 
of Cyprus. At this point, the rotating presidency system is an important issue to secure the rights 
of Turkish Cypriots in the decision-making processes of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, if the 
EU will be included in the guarantee system whereas Turkey will not be included, this would 
be a partial and change the balance of power. 
Finally, Turkey wants to maintain its role as a regional power, and thus the country believes that 
it needs to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. In this respect, Turkey, as well as TRNC, 
have a common view that TRNC needs to be included in the decision-making process. 
Therefore, Turkey and TRNC have been urging for a bi-communal and bi-federal Republic of 
Cyprus.  
 
Conclusion 
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All in all, it can be concluded that since Turkey can be classified as a regional power, other 
countries in the region such as Greece and Republic of Cyprus do want Turkey to increase its 
influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently, there were important projections on natural 
gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the tension in the area including the Cyprus 
conflict makes it hard for the mediation of how to use the hydrocarbon findings. This situation 
has also affected the Cypriot conflict because Greece and Greek Cypriots as well as the other 
parties included wanted to gain the most they can from the energy resources that are discovered 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, it can be asserted that the role of Turkey in the recent 
negotiation affects the course of the negotiation process. However, Turkey has a significant 
coastal line in the region, so the country does not want to be deprived of its rights in the region. 
Also, since Turkey perceives itself as a regional power, it believes that it also perceives itself as 
a supporter of TRNC.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
 
 
In 2015, hopes have risen for a settlement of the conflict since the leaders of both communities 
have demonstrated positive act towards each other by walking through both regions of Cyprus 
together. At the same time, new developments were taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region. These were the water pipeline project from Turkey to TRNC and the recent hydrocarbon 
discoveries in the region. Hence, the thesis tried to investigate whether and in what ways the 
resources (water and natural gas) could become an incentive for mediation. In order to answer 
this question, the thesis was divided into four parts in which the first chapter tried to clarify the 
history of the Cypriot conflict, the second chapter analyzed the water problem of the island and 
its impact on the conflict, the third chapter elaborated on the recent hydrocarbon explorations in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and the recent debates on the EEZ and the effects of these on the 
Cypriot conflict. Finally, in the last chapter the role of Turkey as a rising regional power in the 
Eastern Mediterranean region was analyzed. In this chapter, the obstacles in front of the Cypriot 
negotiation process and Turkey’s place in this nexus was analyzed. Within this context, the 
thesis concluded that due to the rising political concerns of the regional actors (Greek Cypriots, 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots) resources could not act as an incentive in the negotiation process. 
Rather than that, they became elements of bargaining and they added up to the recent problems.  
More elaborately, even though resources could have become an incentive towards the 
negotiation, the historical situations that stem from the past have made this not possible. The 
circumstances that come from the past, limit and shape the actions of the leaders today. Thus, 
the agents cannot act freely since they need to take into account the past circumstances. 
 There are important issues that come from the past and still impose a problem in the conflict 
today. For the resources to become an incentive, past issues must be resolved. Otherwise 
resources would become political tools for bargaining rather than becoming an incentive. In 
order to make a clearer analysis, the thesis chose three issues that comes from the past stages of 
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the conflict and still impose a problem today. These are territorial issues, military issues and the 
issue of rotating presidency which were also clearly identified in the last chapter of the thesis.  
In short, territorial issues is an essential problem that comes from the past because the island 
has a very strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek Cypriots have claims on some 
of the territories in TRNC of which the Karpas peninsula is one of their claims. However, the 
Turkish Cypriot representatives have claimed that this area belongs to the TRNC. As stated in 
the last chapter, today the Syrian conflict and the recent hydrocarbon findings have increased 
the strategic importance of the Karpas peninsula. This area is also of vital importance for Turkey 
to secure itself in the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, it is estimated that the region of the 
Karpas peninsula has undiscovered hydrocarbon reservoirs. Thus, it can be asserted that this 
place is both vital for security reasons and it is also important in terms of increasing gains in 
hydrocarbon revenues for TRNC, Turkey and Greek Cypriots. In this respect, the thesis has 
come to the conclusion that in the case of the Karpas peninsula, the recent hydrocarbon 
discoveries have not acted as an incentive. Instead, they have increased tension in the area. 
Both Greece, Turkey and the U.K have military troops in the island of Cyprus. When the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions are examined, it can be seen that these troops of all parties have 
been on the island for a very long time. In various resolutions throughout the period, the UN has 
urged all parties to remove their military troops and to avoid military exercise in the island. 
Today, still in the Geneva rounds, this issue is a remaining issue that stays as an obstacle. One 
of the reasons for this is that due to security reasons Turkey does not want to remove its troops. 
Here, the thesis has concluded that there have been recent occasions such as the Greek Cypriot 
violation of the EEZ of Turkey. Also, if Turkey removes its troops than it will also not be able 
to protect the Turkish Cypriots and its own rights in the Mediterranean region caused by the 
disputes over the EEZ. 
Finally, rotating presidency is seen as one of the factors that supports the rights of the Turkish 
Cypriots in the government. This issue also stems from the past because three years after the 
Republic of Cyprus was formed, Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the government. 
However, Greek Cypriots are not in favor for a system of rotating presidency in the republic of 
Cyprus. In this respect, in the thesis it is argued that problems of who will govern also have 
various effects on the resources. Since the government cannot be shared, parties are trying to 
77 
 
strengthen their hands politically. Thus, it could be stated that they have started to use resources 
as a political tool rather than using them as an incentive in the negotiation process. 
All in all, the thesis argued that after the change of the agents which are more optimistic towards 
a common solution to the conflict, resource allocation for water and natural gas provides an 
incentive for both actors to negotiate and resolve their conflict. However, these are not enough 
to solve the issue that comes from the past. Conversely, resources have added up to the already 
existing problems. These existing problems are factors that shape the actions of presidents 
(agents) of both communities today. 
After having demonstrated the aim and arguments of this thesis, constraints and limitations 
should also be briefly pointed out. First of all, interviews with Turkish officials could have been 
done to more strongly support the arguments in the thesis. This could not be done in this thesis 
because of time constraints. Secondly, there is also a planned electricity project between Turkey 
and TRNC which is not mentioned in the thesis. This project is still in the planning stage; 
therefore, it was not included it in the research. Thirdly, the thesis only examined the issue in 
terms of politics and the historical relations between the actors. Nevertheless, culture and 
ethnicity are also important determinants of the Cypriot conflict. In the thesis, culture was not 
included because this thesis focused more on a state level approach. Finally, in future researches, 
instead of elaborating on three issues, a broader research could be done on all of the issues that 
come from the past and stand as an obstacle in the negotiation process.  
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Aydın-Düzgit, Senem, and Nathalie Tocci. Turkey and the European Union. London; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
Baudner, Joerg. "The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government." 
Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (2014). 
BBC News. "Dump UN Plan, Greek Cypriots Told." April 07, 2004.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3608771.stm 
Bila, Fikret. “‘Kıbrıs’ta Son Söz Söylenmedi.’” Hurriyet, December 7, 2016. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrista-son-soz-soylenmedi-40300230. 
Bila, Fikret.  “Kıbrıs'ta Aldığımız Ders.” Hurriyet, January 13, 2017. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrista-aldigimiz-ders-40334824. 
Bila, Fikret. “Kıbrıs’In Geleceği.” Hurriyet, January 10, 2017. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrisin-gelecegi-40331438. 
Bilge, Ömer.  “Kıbrıs’Ta Petrol Savaşı.” Hurriyet, June 14, 2009. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/kibris-ta-petrol-savasi-11861921. 
80 
 
“Biography of Mustafa Akıncı.” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Deputy Prime Ministry 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last modified April 27, 2015. http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/biography-
of-mustafa-akinci/. 
Bora, Erhan. “Cyprus in International Law.” Ankara Bar Review, (2013): 29–57. 
http://www.ankarabarosu.org.tr/siteler/AnkaraBarReview/tekmakale/2013-1/1.pdf. 
“BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017”, 2017. 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-
2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-full-report.pdf 
Bryant, Rebecca. “Cyprus 'Peace Water' Project: How It Could Affect Greek-Turkish Relations 
on the Island.” European Politics and Policy. LSE European Institute. November 10, 2015. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/28/how-turkeys-peace-water-project-could-affect-
relations-between-greek-and-turkish-cypriots/. 
Bryant, Rebecca, and Christalla Yakinthou. Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey. Istanbul, Turkey: 
TESEV Publications, 2012. http://tesev.org.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Cypriot_Perceptions_Of_Turkey.pdf. 
Çamlıbel, Cansu. “Akıncı: No Cyprus Deal If No Rotating Presidency.” Hurriyet Daily, 
September 19, 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akinci-no-cyprus-deal-if-no-rotating-
presidency-103999 
"Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts" International Crisis Group. 
March 22, 2013. http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2013/03/22/can-gas-save-
cyprus-the-long-term-cost-of-frozen-conflicts/ 
81 
 
Canyaş, Hüseyin, Süha Kocayanak, and F. Orkunt Canyaş. "The Security Architecture of the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Relations between Israel and Cyprus in Terms of Global Power 
Relations." TODAİE’s Review of Public Administration 7, no. 2 (June 2013): 115-33. 
Chughtai, Alia. “Syrian Civil War Map: Who's in Control Where.” Aljazeera, May 10, 2018. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-
150529144229467.html. 
“Cyprus.” Europa.eu. European Union, Accessed 28 May 2018, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/cyprus_en#overview. 
"Cyprus (Historical Overview)." 2017. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 
March 25, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa.  
Cyprus Mail, “Akinci Wants Uninterrupted EU Harmonisation.”  August 30, 2017. https://cyprus-
mail.com/2017/08/30/akinci-wants-uninterrupted-eu-harmonisation/. 
Cyprus Mail. “Bright Prospects for Cyprus Economy,” December 15, 2017. https://cyprus-
mail.com/2017/12/15/bright-prospects-cyprus-economy/. 
Cyprus Mail. “Cyprus, Egypt Preparing Ground for Gas Pipeline, Foreign Minister Says.” 
Accessed April 10, 2018.  https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/04/10/cyprus-egypt-preparing-
ground-gas-pipeline-foreign-minister-says/  
Cyprus Mail. “Rotating Presidency and Political Equality ‘Different Things’ Anastasiades Said.” 
February 26, 2017. http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/02/26/rotating-presidency-political-equality-
different-things-anastasiades-said/ 
82 
 
Cyprus Mail, “The Peace Plans: 2004 Annan Plan.”  December 29, 2016. https://cyprus-
mail.com/2016/12/29/peace-plans-2004-annan-plan/ 
Cyprus Mail. "Turkey and the Law of the Sea: Some Facts." February 11, 2018. http://cyprus-
mail.com/2018/02/11/turkey-law-sea-facts/ 
Cyprus Profile. “Cyprus Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences.” July 10, 2014. 
http://www.cyprusprofile.com/en/articles/view/cyprus-banking-crisis-causes-and-
consequences-bailout 
“Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive.” 2017. Rep. Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive. 
Dailymail. “Cyprus Slams Turkey's Water Link with Breakaway North.” October 15, 2015. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3274389/Cyprus-slams-Turkeys-water-link-
breakaway-north.html#ixzz5FUo6Hxez. 
De Micco, Pasquale. "The prospect of Eastern Mediterranean gas production: An alternative 
energy supplier for the EU?" Directorate-General for External Policies. European Parliament. 
April 2014: 16. Accessed March 8, 2018. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2014/522339/EXPO-
AFET_SP%282014%29522339_EN.pdf  
“Despite Threats, Exxon Mobil Moves Ahead Off Cyprus.” 2018. The Maritime Executive. March 
14. https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/despite-threats-exxonmobil-moves-ahead-off-
cyprus#gs.25HxJ88. 
Demir, İdris, ed. Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Under the Shadow of the 
Arab Spring. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017: 13-14 
83 
 
Deutsche Welle. “Rival Leaders Take Historic Stroll through Cyprus Capital,” May 23, 2015. 
http://www.dw.com/en/rival-leaders-take-historic-stroll-through-cyprus-capital/a-18472011. 
“Eastmed.” IGI Poseidon. April 6, 2017. http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed. 
Energy Production and Imports.” June 17. Eurostat Statistics Explained. 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports  
Eralp, Atilla. “The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship.” New 
Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 147–68. doi:10.1017/s0896634600005252. 
“Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Republic of 
Cyprus. http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa86_en/mfa86_en?OpenDocument 
“Fossil Fuels.” Our World in Data. Accessed April 20, 2018. https://ourworldindata.org/fossil-
fuels. 
“Gas 2O17 / Analysis and Forecasts to 2O22 / Executive Summary.” 2017. Gas 2O17 / Analysis 
and Forecasts to 2O22 / Executive Summary. International Energy Agency. 
https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/gas2017MRSsum.pdf. 
Granitsas, Alkman, and Stelios Bouras. “Greek Maritime Claims Rock Boat With Turkey.” The 
Wall Street Journal. March 7, 2013. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323978104578332352776971978.  
“Greek-Turkish Dispute over the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.” Hellenic Republic 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 20, 2018. https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-
turkish-relations/relevant-documents/delimitation-of-the-continental-shelf.html. 
84 
 
Gürel, Ayla, Fiona Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras. “The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, 
Positions and Future Scenarios.” Rep.  Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 2013. 
https://files.prio.org/publication_files/Cyprus/Report 2013-1 Hydrocarbons.pdf. 
Hadjitofi, Michael. “Gas in Cyprus: Opportunities for Dutch Business & Knowledge Institutions.” 
2017. Rep. Gas in Cyprus: Opportunities for Dutch Business & Knowledge Institutions. 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Nicosia, Cyprus.14.  
Herzog, Chen, Norden Shalabna, and Guy Maor. "Israel Natural Gas Demand Forecast 2017-
2040." July 2, (2017):85. https://www.delek-group.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/BDO-
Gas-Market-Forecast-2-07-2017-for-Delek-Group-with-final-letter-1.pdf 
Hoffman, Clemens. “From Small Streams to Pipe Dreams – The Hydro-Engineering of the 
Cyprus Conflict.” Mediterranean Politics 23 no. 2 (2017): 265–85. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2016.1264137?journalCode=fmed20. 
Hurriyet.  “KKTC Su Temin Projesi'nin Açılışı Gerçekleştirildi,” October 17, 2015. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kktc-su-temin-projesinin-acilisi-gerceklestirildi-
30333510. 
Hurriyet Daily. “Greek Cypriots Don’t Intend to Use Turkish Water, Turkish Deputy Prime 
Minister Says,” December 12, 2017. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greek-cypriots-dont-
intend-to-use-turkish-water-turkish-deputy-prime-minister-says-124023. 
Hurriyet Daily.  “Turkish Cyprus Receives Millions of Tons of Fresh Water from Turkey,” 
August 16, 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-cyprus-receives-millions-of-tons-
of-fresh-water-from-turkey---102910. 
85 
 
Iacovides, Iacovos. “Water Resources in Cyprus: Endowments and Water Management 
Practices.” Essay. In Water Resources Allocation: Policy and Socioeconomic Issues in Cyprus, 
Global Issues in Water Policy 1, edited by P. Koundour. Springer Science Buisness Media 
B.V. 2011. https://www.springer.com/us/book/9789048198245 
İnan, Yüksel, and Yücel Acer. “THE AEGEAN DISPUTES.” Foreign Policy. n.d. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/251202.pdf 
"Israel's Leviathan Field Development Progress." Lebanon Gas News. September 04, 2017. 
https://lebanongasnews.com/wp/leviathan-field-development-progress/. 
Kahveci Özgür, Hayriye.  “Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons: Regional Potential, Challenges 
Ahead, and the ‘Hydrocarbon-Ization’ of the Cyprus Problem.” Perceptions 22 (2017): 37. 
http://sam.gov.tr/tr/eastern-mediterranean-hydrocarbons-regional-potential-challenges-ahead-
and-the-hydrocarbon-ization-of-the-cyprus-problem-hayriye-kahveci-ozgur/. 
Kakouris, Stephen. “Cyprus Looks to Revive Vasilikos LNG Plan.” Interfax Global Energy. 
Interfax Energy Ltd. March 16, 2017. http://interfaxenergy.com/gasdaily/article/25072/cyprus-
looks-to-revive-vasilikos-lng-plan. 
Kamburoğlu, İnanç. Behind the change in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus between 2002 
and 2004: the impact of leadership and the EU. 2015. PhD Thesis. University of Nottingham. 
Ker-Lindsay, James. UN involvement in Cyprus after the 2004 referendum. 2006. Retrieved from 
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/2af14cce-7c05-4552-b1c8-75e5c17c0e80.pdf  
Keyman, E. Fuat. “A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive ‘Moral Realism.’” Insight 
Turkey 19 no.1 (2017): 55–69. 
86 
 
Keyman, E. Fuat, and Şebnem Gümüşçü. Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey: 
Hegemony Through Transformation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014: 71-72.   
"Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangici.". T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. 
Accessed March 25, 2018. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-meselesinin-tarihcesi_-bm-
muzakerelerinin-baslangici.tr.mfa  
Kıbrıs Postası. “Tüm Ülke Kuraklık Alanı İlan Edildi,” April 26, 2008. 
http://www.kibrispostasi.com/c35-KIBRIS_HABERLERI/n12999-Tum-ulke-kuraklik-alani-
ilan-edildi. 
“KKTC’Ye Yapılan TC Yardımları 2008 YILI FAALİYET RAPORU.” 2008. KKTC’Ye Yapılan 
TC Yardımları 2008 YILI FAALİYET RAPORU. T.C. Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliği. 
http://www.kei.gov.tr/media/1146/2008-faliyet-raporu.pdf. 
Klokkaris, Phivos. “The Security Problem of Cyprus.” Rep. European Rim Policy and Investment 
Center, (2009), https://erpic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/the-security-problem-of-cyprus-
2009.pdf 
Kyris, George. “Is Mustafa Akinci the Best Hope Yet for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem?” The 
Guardian. April 28, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/28/mustafa-
akinci-solve-cyprus-problem-turkey-election. 
Lo, Chris. “Timeline: Game-Changing Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Offshore 
Technology, December 13, 2017. https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/timeline-
game-changing-gas-discoveries-eastern-mediterranean/. 
87 
 
Mail Online. “Cyprus Slams Turkey's Water Link with Breakaway North.” October 15, 2015. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3274389/Cyprus-slams-Turkeys-water-link-
breakaway-north.html#ixzz5FUo6Hxez. 
Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: Die Revolution, 1852. 
Mason, Michael, and Rebecca Bryant. “Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus.” 
Rep. Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus. Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 2017. 
https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1361&type=publicationfile. 
Morelli, Vincent L. Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive. Congressional Research Service. July 
24, 2018. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf 
Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. “The Cyprus Debacle: What the Future Holds.” Futures 31 no.6 (1999): 
559–75. doi:10.1016/s0016-3287(99)00014-2. 
 Müftüler Baç, Meltem. ‘Turkey’s Political Reforms: The Impact of the European Union’, South 
east European Politics and Societies 10, no.1 (2005): 16-30. 
Müftüler-Bac, Meltem, and Lauren McLaren. “Enlargement preferences and policy-making in the 
European union: Impacts on turkey.” Journal of European Integration 25, no.1 (2003): 17-30. 
Müftüler-Bac, Meltem and Yaprak Gursoy, “Is there a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign 
Policy? : An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates.” Turkish Studies 11, no. 3, 
(September 2010): 405-427. 
“Natural Gas and its Advantages.” n.d. Shell Global. https://www.shell.com/energy-and-
innovation/natural-gas/natural-gas-and-its-advantages.html. 
88 
 
"Natural Gas and the Environment," U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), June 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_environment. 
Nugent, Neill. “EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus problem’.” Journal of Common Market Studies 
38 no. 1 (2000): 131-50. 
Oberling, Pierre. The Double Representation Conspiracy: How the Greek and Greek Cypriot 
Governments Are Precipitating a New Crisis in Cyprus by Using the European Union. 
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Kitabevi, 2015. 
PortsEurope. “Cyprus to Invest in Vassilikos Port LNG Facility.” September 17, 2017. 
http://www.portseurope.com/cyprus-to-invest-in-vassilikos-port-lng-facility/. 
"Portuguese Task Group for the Extension of the Continental Shelf." EMEPC. 
https://www.emepc.pt/en/146-kit-do-mar/ponte/etapas?start=18 
“Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” n.d. United Nations. United 
Nations. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm 
89 
 
Ratner, Michael. "Natural Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean." August 15, 2016: 5. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44591.pdf 
“Regarding the Natural Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Deputy Prime Ministry and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of TRNC. Last modified February 13, 2018. 
http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/statement-regarding-natural-resources-eastern-mediterranean/. 
Reuters. “Drought-Hit Cyprus Starts Emergency Water Rations,” March 24, 2008. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-water-idUSL2455576320080324. 
Rosen, Armin, and Jeremy Bender. "The Most Powerful Militaries in The Middle East 
[RANKED]." Business Insider. October 27, 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/most-
powerful-militaries-in-the-middle-east-2014-8#no-2-turkey-15 
Rumelili, Bahar. The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict. Working paper. 
Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham. (2004): 
8-9. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-
society/polsis/research/2006/eu-border-conflict/wp06-eu-impact-on-the-greek-turkish-
conflict.pdf. 
Sigma Live. “Russia: Turkey Needs to Express Support to Cyprus Talks,” June 25, 2016. 
http://www.sigmalive.com/en/news/politics/146290/russia-turkey-needs-to-express-support-
to-cyprus-talks. 
Siousiouras, Petros, and Georgios Chrysochou, “The Aegean Dispute in the Context of 
Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation.” Laws, January 14, 2014. 
www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/3/1/12/pdf 
90 
 
Skalamera, Morena. “Energy Security in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis: Getting the Real Threats 
Right.” Global Policy, July 2015. 
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/sites/default/files/Skalamera - Energy Security in the 
Wake of the Ukraine Crisis, Getting the Real 07.15.pdf. 
Sofroniou, Anastasia, and Steven Bishop. “Water Scarcity in Cyprus: A Review and Call for 
Integrated Policy.” Water 6, no. 10 (2014) http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/6/10/2898/htm. 
Sonyel, Salahi R. “The European Union and the Cyprus Imbroglio.” Perceptions, (1998) :78. 
Sozcu. “‘KKTC Su Temin Projesi’ Hizmete Alındı,” November 17, 2015. 
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/ekonomi/kktc-su-temin-projesi-aciliyor-962092/. 
“Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
N.d.http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa 
Tagliapietra, Simone. “The EU-Turkey Energy Relations After the 2014 Ukraine Crisi: 
Enhancing Th Partnership in a Rapidly Changing Environment.” Energy:Resource and 
Markets Series, 2014. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107714/1/NDL2014-075.pdf 
“The Eastern Mediterranean's New Great Game Over Natural Gas.” Stratfor. February 22, 2018. 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/eastern-mediterraneans-new-great-game-over-natural-
gas 
The Economist, “Come Together?”  April 28, 2015. 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21649892-re-unification-supporter-wins-turkish-
cypruss-presidential-elections-come-together. 
91 
 
“The Minister of Foreign Affairs Met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy.” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs - Republic of Cyprus. Last modified September 13, 2016. 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/CDF95BCFE095EFE8C225802D00371FB2?Op
enDocument&highlight=natural gas. 
The National Herald. “Cyprus Slams Turkey’s Water Link.” October 15, 2015. 
https://www.thenationalherald.com/102266/cyprus-slams-turkeys-water-link/. 
The National Herald. “US Navy Arrives Off Cyprus, Near Turkish Warships Blockade”. March 
7, 2018. https://www.thenationalherald.com/192914/us-navy-arrives-off-cyprus-near-turkish-
warships-blockade/ 
“The Outstanding Aegean Issues.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. n.d. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues---aegean-sea---the-outstanding-aegean-issues.en.mfa. 
Times of Israel, “Cyprus water plan: Peace pipeline or Trojan Horse?” March 1, 2014. 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/cyprus-water-plan-peace-pipeline-or-trojan-horse/ 
"Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Kronolojisi." Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı. August 7, 2017. 
https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/2017_08/kronoloji.pdf 
Ünal, Ali. “ORSAM Chair Professor Ahmet Uysal: Operation Olive Branch Advancing 
Cautiously to Minimize Casualties, Prevent Collateral Damage.” Daily Sabah, February 11, 
2018. https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2018/02/12/orsam-chair-professor-ahmet-
uysal-operation-olive-branch-advancing-cautiously-to-minimize-casualties-prevent-collateral-
damage. 
“UNSCR Search Engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.”. Security Council 
Resolution 649 - UNSCR. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/649. 
92 
 
 “World Economic Outlook”. IMF. April 2018. 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/TUR/SYR/SAU/ISR/IRN/IRQ/EG
Y/ARE/LBN/QAT/YEM/OMN/JOR/KWT/BHR 
“World Energy Outlook.” International Energy Agency. 2017: 339 
"Zohr: production underway in record time." ENI. Accessed March 08, 2018. 
https://www.eni.com/en_IT/operations/upstream/exploration-model/zohr-egypt.page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
